The Evolutionary Basis and Origins of Human Moral Systems
Having identified the innate cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies and capacities which comprise the major dimensions of human nature, we can begin to extrapolate principles, rights and responsibilities that are most in accordance with human nature at the aggregate level. Although our picture of human nature is becoming substantively complete, there are still some basic human tendencies that need to be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins and functions. For instance, we evolved to be an autonomous, cooperative and communicative species because autonomy, cooperation and communication conferred genetic fitness and were generally conducive to the survivability of the small kinship groups to which we belonged in human prehistory. Similarly, we evolved a latent capacity to become combative or aggressive when our territory, resources, or our own survival was threatened by an outgroup. And, we evolved a separate capacity to experience a xenophobic response towards outgroups, based upon the perception of significant visible differences in these outgroups. Thus, both the capacities for aggression and xenophobia evolved as essential aspects of our genetic makeup and temperament, even as they also require certain conditions to manifest themselves. These traits are among the major parameters which define the essence of our nature as a species, or our "net" predispositions. And, properly, it is our net predispositions, or the aggregate sum of the most widely representative cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies that should be the primary reference points for an optimal system of natural law. And, any society that is not based on such a system, or any society that does not acknowledge or that fails to adequately account for such tendencies will not be optimally stable, robust, or conducive to human survivability over the longer term.

The Relationship of the Innate Moral Sense to The Current Task
Before we can begin to extrapolate rights and responsibilities from what we know about human nature, we must ask some fundamental questions about the nature of our moral beliefs in general. Is morality a concept which has a natural basis that is related to the survivability of the species, or is it solely a human convention? And if our concepts about morality are only human conventions which have no basis in our nature, or no relationship to the ultimate ends of our species, then one interpretation of  morality or law would not be able to command any more moral authority than any other, and moral relativism would become more credible. Thus, being able to logically point to something in our nature as a source of legitimacy for our system of morality, and as the basis for our system of natural law is of critical importance. In addition, to the extent that we have evolved an innate moral sense from which notions of justice naturally emanate, and to which they must appeal for their legitimacy, our task may be made much easier. However, the concept of an innate moral sense is not without its own difficulties.

Presumably, there will be occasions when reason and knowledge will come into conflict with what feelings associated with our innate moral sense tell us is right. And, when feelings associated with our innate moral sense come into conflict with what reason and knowledge tell us is the proper course, reason and knowledge must prevail. Thus, while our moral sense may provide us with a good basic guide to what is right "naturally" in the absence of a system of knowledge; when accurate knowledge that relates to the survivability of the species is available, we must rely on this knowledge to inform and mediate what our innate moral sense tells us is right. Where the determination of the species interest is concerned, we cannot rely completely on this moral sense to the exclusion of reason and knowledge. This is a fundamental premise of our moral technology. But even this is not without its problems. The problem of differential functionality of human traits over time and in response to different circumstances must be addressed.

The human species has evolved certain temperaments that were generally conducive to its survival over a broad range of environmental circumstances which it encountered in its evolutionary history. But, conceivably, some of these traits might not be conducive to its survival today. Hence, it is necessary to mediate our "proximal moral sense" with knowledge of the current challenges facing the species. Hopefully, evolution will prove to be a complement to the challenges we face. And, it is likely that given the broad range of temperamental propensities that we have been endowed with by the evolutionary process, some of these propensities will prove useful in conjunction with knowledge. Once again, the important point is that our innate moral sense must be mediated by knowledge. For once knowledge that is related to the species interest becomes available, it must be applied to all systems of conventions (laws) which originated in a previous era, and which may be based on the basis of quasi-instinctive feelings associated with the innate moral sense.

Quite often knowledge which is relevant to the species interest will tend to reinforce and corroborate the innate moral sense. However, on those rare occasions when this is not the case, there may be circumstances when knowledge is of a particular kind that, when it mediates and conditions our moral sense (either individually or in the aggregate), it causes this moral sense to operate in a way that it otherwise would not without this knowledge. There will be cases when what one is inclined to believe on the basis of one's moral sense alone (or how one is inclined to feel and act as a result of one's predominating temperamental propensities), will be at odds with what the reason and knowledge gained from experience point to as being in the best interest of the species over the longer term. When the two come into conflict (i.e. when what the moral sense tells us is right, conflicts with what reason and knowledge tell us is in the best interest of the species over the longer term), the individual must defer to what reason and knowledge tell us are in the interest of the species. As John Locke said, reason is the voice of God in man. And, we are bound by divine duty to follow reason. Insofar as we heed this advice, the natural moral sense is not likely to come into conflict with the species interest. For, along with reason, we were endowed with this sense by evolutionary processes. And, the innate moral sense is already preset in some degree to work in tandem with reason. It will generally only come into conflict with the species interest when it is relied upon exclusively at the level of sentiment, or when it is used to block information which is related to the species interest. But, there are examples where the innate moral sense has manifested itself in a form which is not maximally conducive to the welfare of the species. Pacifism is a case in point.

When our moral sense manifests itself in a form such a pacifism, it definitely poses a threat to the species interest. For the logical tendency of pacifism is to reject the use of violence even when it is needed in service of the species' defense. Carried to its extreme, the logical result of pacifism is total disarmament, which would expose the species to harm by it worst and most violent elements. In our current survival mode, and at this critical juncture of the species' development, and when we are attempting to identify and suppress dysfunctional elements of the species (including those elements which have a wrong conception of the species interests), pacifism would be a mortal threat to the survivability of the species. Although conceivably, in a future state, and once the most violent elements of the species have been identified and neutralized, and once the species has begun to coalesce around a more complete understanding of its own interests, pacifism may prevail defacto because major threats to the species have been substantially eliminated.

Innate Rights and Prescriptions for Moral Behavior
The innate moral sense causes us to feel revulsion towards the perception of wrongs done to another, or towards another's pain and suffering. It is closely associated with our capacity for empathy, or our ability to see others as a reflection of ourselves, and with our ability to vicariously experience another's feelings, to a certain extent. Still, to properly formulate a system of natural laws, we must ask the question: Is the innate tendency to experience empathy equivalent to a moral sense, or a sense of what is right and wrong? It would seem that we do have such a moral sense in some degree. But, it would also seem that the strength of the innate moral sense appears to vary greatly between individuals. Despite this variability, the strength of the moral sense, or the way that individuals seem to experience it seems to fall within a normal range. This range defines the nature and boundaries of the moral sense. This sense depends upon individual temperaments and must be thought of as an aggregate tendency. Yet, the variability of this trait raises certain questions where moral rights and responsibilities are concerned. For if there is variability in moral tendencies or in moral predispositions, how does this variability translate into natural rights? How can a consistent and rational standard be based on the moral sense if it varies greatly between individuals? Are some natural tendencies of mind illegitimate and immoral by nature and, if so, how could these natural tendencies have evolved and what survival value could they have? Is their value limited to a presocietal state of nature with no corresponding survival value in our current state of social development? As part of our evolutionary legacy, have we been endowed with vestigial traits which continue to serve functions in certain limited contexts, but which are not defining aspects of our nature? Such questions must be considered in our search for rights and responsibilities which arise from our natures, and which, mediated by knowledge, promise to best serve the species interest.

The Basic Political Right of Self Determination
We know that even while man is born free, for a portion of his life he is subordinate to his parents and to their will. But, it is also true that parents have a natural right to rule over and determine the actions of their children, not by virtue of their superior strength, but by virtue of their superior knowledge, and by virtue of their responsibility as their children's guardians. And not only that, most parents have an interest in their own children's welfare, i.e. they have a survival interest which extends to their own offspring. In a sense, by promoting the growth and achievement of their children, they are promoting their own interests, as their children are a reflection of their genetic essence. And insofar as they are competent caretakers of this interest, they will seek to preserve the child in health and security, and they will seek to impart, as best they can, the knowledge which they deem useful and which they believe will benefit the child in its later encounters with life. If they adequately exercise their responsibilities as parents to do all these things, then their "rule" over the child is legitimate. The parents rule over the child only becomes illegitimate if they abuse the child, subject it to unnecessary risks or otherwise treat it in a manner which is not consistent with its best interest. Punishment, in this context, is not ill treatment, even if it is of a mild corporal variety. If the punishment tends to impart useful lessons which will aid the child in its later dealings with life, it will ultimately avoid much more pain than it causes. Thus, before the child has reached the "age of reason and understanding," before the child has developed the skills and acquired the knowledge necessary for dealing with life and for existing on its own, it presumably does not have the "right" of self determination, because it does not have the "ability" of self determination.

By extension, before a people have developed or acquired reason and knowledge that is sufficient for their effective self governance, they may not be competent in their choice of leaders. They may only be likely to injure themselves by the exercise of this right, in an uneducated state. Some would even argue that in an uneducated state, they do not even have the right of self determination (Jefferson would argue that only those who are able to see how to best use their freedom have the right of self determination). All that this establishes is that a seemingly nebulous quality of reason, tempered and informed by a certain kind of knowledge, is necessary for self governance. What then is this faculty called reason? Stated simply, reason is the average ability to figure things out, to problem solve, to understand the world around us, and the ability to convert this understanding into useful knowledge.

Mainly by virtue of their ability to reason, and notwithstanding that there may be substantial qualitative differences in their ability to reason, men are born "equal." This is their natural state from which their inalienable rights proceed. And although men are born into a de facto state of subservience to their parents, they are presumed to have certain implicit and inalienable rights when they reach adulthood (i.e. as potential "men" they came into the world with equal rights under a "natural" system of justice that is bounded and determined by aggregate human predispositions). Under a more advanced system of justice (one which actually begins to codify rules and to extrapolate these rules from the nature of man) they all have the right of protection under the laws. They are not born naturally into a state of civil subservience, or they are not born naturally the possession of another. This convention (slavery), while it has occurred throughout a significant part of human history, is an unnatural and an unstable arrangement. Similarly, men are not born owing allegiance to any man (except by their own consent, which they are incompetent to give at the time of their birth). Thus, in their natural state, they are on an equal plane with other men with regard to their natural rights. And, in fact, this is what is meant by their being "created equal", before nature. By extending these conclusions we can arrive at certain principles which will influence the form our political institutions should take.

Once men have been educated in a way that will allow them to exercise their consent in a reasoned way, or in a way that will best serve their own self interests, they may legitimately give their consent to be governed. And, under these circumstances, the government they elect is their legitimate government, unless it betrays the public trust which they have given it, and unless it begins to be destructive of the ends for which it was created (i.e. the ends of securing the inalienable rights which no man has a right to take without due process). This we can take to be the first premise of government, namely, the right to consent to be governed, and to institute government to safeguard the essential inalienable rights as human beings. Depending on their circumstances and the extent of the knowledge which is available and which is relevant to their own survival (if not also the survival of the species), the knowledge men need to be politically competent or competent for self rule will vary over time. At any one point in time, we can call this knowledge (that knowledge which is required to exercise their right to consent to be governed in a manner that is consistent with their own interest, and with the interest of the species) the civil ideology of the nation. Within the broad parameters set by democratic theory, the content of this ideology is highly variable and can take a number of forms, depending upon the values, attitudes and beliefs that are deemed optimally functional at a particular point in time, and in response to a set of environmental challenges facing the species (or a particular people) at a particular point in time.

The Basic Political Right of Freedom of Speech
Even a basic right such as the freedom of speech is not an absolute right and must be constrained, to the extent that it can be exercised in a way that will tend to bring harm to the community. For instance, it is a well known example that the freedom of speech does not extend to the point where it allows one to shout "fire" in a crowded theater, for the purpose of creating a panic, or for some other deleterious purpose. Such basic rights as the freedom of speech are not absolutes, and the state can impose reasonable limits on such rights in order to secure the
general welfare.

Taking up the argument again that the state shares some responsibility for the moral development of its citizens, cultural and artistic works should be held to an entirely different standard than political speech. The argument that there can be no clear distinction between artistic expression and political speech is a subterfuge designed to distort the extent to which freedom of speech extends to cultural works. It is specifically designed to bring artistic freedom under the umbrella of protection extended to political speech, which it does not rightly deserve.

Among other things, spontaneous speech, communication and thought tend to characterize the natural state of men. From this natural state one could extrapolate the freedoms of speech and expression. Because the freedoms of speech and expression are part our natural condition, such freedoms would appear to have a basis in natural law. To begin with, owing to our nature, there are apparently many freedoms that we should be entitled to, even as reason will attempt to constrain these freedoms and direct them in such a way that they result in the maximization of the survivability of the species. But, there is a form that these freedoms assume in their natural state which should be distinguished from any "conventional" aspects which some may attempt to impose upon them. The latter have no necessary sanction or protection under natural law. As they occur naturally, and as an expression of aggregate human temperament, these freedoms do not naturally take the form which offends the human psyche. In short, they do not naturally take an anti-social form or a moral form which violates the innate moral sense. When the exercise of freedoms take a form which offends aspects of the psyche, or when they take an anti-social form, or a moral form which violates the innate moral sense, or when they oppose basic elements of human nature, they reveal their qualities as artifacts of culture, or conventions which have no justification in natural law. Thus, forms of expression which most find "naturally" repugnant can have no protection under natural law. This serves as the natural law basis for decency laws which are based on community standards. The community (i.e. every local community) has the right to establish such laws, when such laws are deemed necessary to serve the greater public interest.

When cultural works emerge which derive their primary commercial value from their ability to outrage or offend, such works have no necessary protection under natural law. Such works can achieve commercial viability because there is a definite subpopulation which will pay to witness works which they know push the bounds of propriety, and which they know others will find outrageous or offensive. Such works are a relatively innocuous way that some groups find to challenge the status quo of a social system, or to challenge a system of social norms which they find constraining or threatening. Usually, the same people who seek such forms of entertainment occupy a relatively low station in society and do not see themselves as having a vested interest in society. In any case, they do not tend to represent the prevailing views (which are manifestations of dominant underlying temperamental propensities) and they tend to be unrepresentative of the whole. They also do not tend to reflect the better judgment of the community, as mediated by reason and knowledge. Rather, such groups prefer "artistic" works which offend community standards, and which have no "redeeming social value" because such works appeal to their own unrepresentative temperamental predispositions.

The naturally occurring temperamental propensities of the majority serve to define the natural boundaries of the freedoms of speech and expression. Those forms of expression that are without socially redeeming value cannot claim protection under these freedoms. That is, those forms of expression which offend the net temperamental predispositions of the species are afforded no protection. By extension, the freedoms which we have under natural law are not unconditional freedoms. They have certain natural boundaries which are imposed by our innate or proximal moral sense, acting in combination with other senses, with our net temperamental predispositions, and with our reason and knowledge. Hence, quite "naturally" such freedoms have natural limits and are not unconditional. It is up to us to establish and enforce the bounds of such freedoms using "informed reason" to determine what is in the interest of the community. It is the duty and responsibility of the community to determine the limits of these freedoms and, where necessary, to "censor" the expression of certain cultural forms to bring them into closer accord with the limits suggested by our natural predispositions and inhibitions. It is the duty and the responsibility of the community to confine forms of cultural expression within their natural and functional bounds.

By nature, an artist wants to be free from all constraints. He even wants to be free from those constraints which are mandated by considerations of the public interest, or by considerations of the probable social impacts of his creative works. Quite understandably, artists do not want to be burdened by such considerations. Artists will maintain that, as it applies to their work, freedoms are absolute and should not be encumbered by such considerations as how their works might adversely impact the community's interests. But no other freedom is similarly free of such constraints or considerations. No other freedom is absolute, so why should the freedom of speech be absolute? And, in fact, no such absolute freedom exists. Judges can issue gag orders; communities can prohibit nude dancing; the sale of pornographic magazines and a host of other activities which offend "community standards." Alternatively, based upon differences in their local standards, and differences in their propensities, some communities may permit such activities, within reasonable limits. If community standards exceed these limits, then "higher civil authority" has the right to intervene, purely on the basis of its ultimate jurisdiction under natural law. "Free speech" which offends "larger" community standards can be prohibited. In fact, the people in general have every right to elect censors to proscribe freedom of speech. These are reasonable measures that proceed from the knowledge that freedom of speech is not an absolute right.

For instance, when the culture industry generates works that can be reasonably interpreted as an assault upon certain norms deemed to be in the interest of the community, when the creative artist would like to be free to make such an assault because such freedom is likely to make his work both easier and potentially even more lucrative (by virtue of its appeal to an aberrant subpopulation), or when the production of such works can be reasonably expected to have a deleterious effect on the normative development of the most vulnerable elements of society (particularly the uneducated, the poor, and the young) then, under these conditions, there is no principle under natural law which would prevent the state from proscribing such works. Quite the reverse. There are principles under natural law which would demand the state's intervention to protect and advance the public interest. Under the conditions just outlined, it is the state's prerogative and responsibility to discourage the production and dissemination of such works to serve the public interest. As a means of discouraging the production and dissemination of such "creative" works, the state might simply refuse to enforce copyright protections for such works, even as it does not actually prohibit the production or distribution of such works, and even as it allows such works to be marketed freely without copyright protection. By means of selectively enforcing copyright laws, the state can practice an effective control on the production and distribution of cultural or artistic works that it deems offensive (according to the authority vested in it by the greater community), or for the purpose of promoting the public morals. If the legislators who institute such standards adopt standards that are too strict, then the people will have the option of removing them from office at the next election.

The selective enforcement of copyright laws to discourage the production and distribution of certain artistic works which are designated to be "without redeeming social value" and which are considered to be offensive or to have an "unfavorable effect on the public morals" obviously constitutes a form of censorship and a constraint upon the freedom of speech. Yet, while this more explicit and effective means of directing the exercise of the freedom of speech into outlets designed to promote the public interest may constitute censorship, it is essentially no different in kind from the current "reasonable standard test" which is already placed on such freedoms. This standard attempts to defer to the community's determination of what constitutes obscenity and which, de facto, results in the selective enforcement of obscenity standards.

Whether it is the form of community standards or in the form of a prohibition against screaming "fire" in crowded theater, the freedom of speech is already regulated and conditional. By their very nature, such freedoms are not absolutes. Yet, many people speak of such freedoms as if they were absolutes. Inevitably, the most energetic defenders of such unregulated and unconditional freedoms tend to derive their livelihoods from the exercise of these freedoms, and they tend to have a bias on this account.

The people have a right to change or challenge the conditions and the bounds of the freedoms that they derive from natural law. Within certain reasonable limits, the people have the right  to make their freedoms more strict or more lenient as functionality dictates. This right has been vividly illustrated in some countries. In the United States for example, for the better part of the twentieth century, the film industry voluntarily censored its own work, so as not to offend either the public morals, or those who unofficially enforced the public morals. As the moral fabric of society became more elastic, the film industry relaxed its standards accordingly. Eventually, virtually all censorship of the entertainment industry ceased. Yet, even more explicit forms of censorship than these can still have sanction under natural law. And, until relatively recently in our history (and before certain groups assumed it was their sacred duty to advance their commercial interests by attempting to construe the freedom of speech as broadly as possible) the idea of such censorship was an acceptable idea, if it could be reasonably expected to render a public service, or if it could be expected to contribute to the public morality. Thus, in the framework of a natural law doctrine which places considerations of functionality first and foremost, selective enforcement of copyright laws as a means of censorship would be acceptable, as long as it does not apply to political speech.

Political speech is a distinctive form of expression and is a protected category of speech. Forms of culture which offend community standards have no similar natural right to protection. As for the argument that music and other cultural forms can be used to convey political and social messages, they are not a primary means for such conveyance. As such, they are not entitled to the same protections as political speech. The ability of music or other cultural forms to convey political information does not entitle them to the same protections that are afforded political speech. These forms of creative expression are cultural in nature and are intended for entertainment. And, as forms of entertainment, they are not primarily devoted to political speech. By contrast, political satire or cartoons which defame public officials, or the use of profanity in political oratory, etc. are clearly protected as forms of political speech.

The Basic Political Right of Freedom of Association
As a matter of natural law, there can be nothing wrong with organizations which restrict their membership to a category which is itself a protected category under natural law. That is to say, there can be nothing wrong with the establishment of a private organization which admits only men, only women, only white women, only black men, only white men or only oriental men and women, etc. All such associations are based upon the natural bonds of affinity we have for others of our own kind. As such, all such associations have sanction under natural law. They have sanction because they reflect the most natural strain of human cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies. These tendencies manifest themselves collectively as a tendency to associate with others on the basis of similarities in sexual or racial characteristics.

The act of segregating or associating on the basis of genetic characteristics represents a category of behavior which is grounded in innate cognitive, affective and behavioral predispositions. Under certain circumstances and in certain situations, people naturally prefer to associate with others who share their sexual and or racial characteristics. The freedom to associate on the basis of such characteristics is manifest under natural law. Consequently, every effort should be made to protect this basic freedom, despite the protests or concerns of contemporary social engineers. Many contemporary social engineers are more concerned with preventing any patterns of associations (even those which have a strong natural basis) that could cause a group in society to be come insular, or to distinguish itself from the rest of society. Correspondingly, these social engineers support legislation which would prohibit certain forms of voluntary association which practice exclusion on the basis of race or sex.

The natural tendency to form associations on the basis of such characteristics can be seen asserting itself in school cafeterias, board rooms, personal friendships and in countless other "voluntary" associations. This is the natural tendency of the species asserting itself over the false ideals that are championed by contemporary social engineers. Social engineers in the advertising and entertainment industries depict patterns of association between members of different racial groups which conform with their ideals of the way they would like men to behave, rather than with the facts of how they actually do behave. By such means, the advertising and entertainment industries conspire to create the illusion that social arrangements and patterns of association which are unnatural are in fact natural.

Contemporary social engineers have set us on a course that is in direct contravention of natural law. Again, no attempt has been made here to discount the power that socialization has to "overwrite" what are natural behavioral tendencies. However, it should give us pause whenever attempts are made to subvert or prevent the expression of natural tendencies that are widespread among human beings, in order to make certain institutions succeed which were never in our nature to create in the first place. It should also give us pause whenever attempts are made to design social conventions that are not maximally in accord with important elements of our nature.

Rights and Responsibilities Related to the Freedom of Consent
In Jeffersonian thought, not all have the power to grant their consent. But a government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed, and men have a natural right to consent to their own rule. Supposedly, we can appeal to something in the order of nature (including man's nature and his behavioral predispositions) for this first principle of government. Pursuing this logic further, we can say that man is typically in an unhappy state when he is ruled by others to whom did not give his consent, and that he functions better, and is more productive under a system in which he gives such consent. And, man is less restive under a system to which he has given his consent. On these grounds, a social system is more stable and conducive to his survival if it asks for his consent. This does not end the problem of when consent is properly granted.  For, as has been said, man can give his consent to a form of government that is illegitimate according to natural law. He would do this if he unknowingly gave consent to a regime that would, for the most part, exercise arbitrary power over his person and his property. But suppose that his nation was in a state of emergency, and under dire threat. Suppose that there was a need for extreme and unusual measures to combat this threat. Suppose he was willing to relinquish his right of consent, because he believed that by giving up his consent, or by temporarily vesting it in a central authority, both he and his nation would stand a better chance of survival. Does he have such a right to "consent" to give up his consent?

Seemingly, under certain circumstances, such extreme measures as consenting to give up the right to consent "on a temporary basis" would be justified. And yet, even under those rare and exotic circumstances which could serve as legitimate grounds for giving up consent, in order to insure some collective or long term good, we cannot help but think about an extreme example in which people "in effect" democratically chose to surrender their freedoms and when it resulted in an extraordinary abuse of power. The case that most readily comes to mind is Nazi Germany. It is well known that Hitler was democratically elected, even though he only won by way of a plurality.

Basic Economic Rights and Responsibilities Under Natural Law
Among the most important rights which seems to immediately spring from the nature of man is the right of  survival, or having the means by which to procure one's survival. In the broadest sense, freedom means being able to engage in activities that one chooses and to behave as one likes, without restraints. This also includes the freedom to engage in those activities necessary to secure the necessities of life, which encompasses the full range of man's economic activities. Most importantly, it includes the right to secure a living wage through one's efforts. Implicit in this freedom would seem to be the right "to have a job" as a means of obtaining a living wage. And, when social circumstances have changed so much that the average person becomes separated from the means of production (or separated from the means by which they might naturally obtain subsistence through farming, fishing, hunting etc.) then it would seem that the state incurs a certain responsibility to provide them with some degree of economic security, as well as to provide them with the training and skills they will need to become members of the workforce. And, when jobs are scarce, it would also seem that the state has a responsibility to foster the economic conditions that are necessary to maintain a "relatively" high level of employment.

Also, under conditions where the jobs produced by the economy fall significantly short of the number of people who are seeking employment, the state would seem to incur some obligation to either stimulate economic growth or to "artificially employ and absorb" the surplus workforce, insofar as it is able to accomplish this without posing an unacceptable burden on those who must finance the state, and insofar as it can employ people usefully and in a manner that is consistent with the general welfare. This sounds like it could have come from Marx, but Jefferson said as much, in different terms. By extension, the state has responsibility for creating the conditions under which its citizens can realize their right to a living wage. That is to say, certain employment rights would naturally seem to spring from their right to subsistence. Thus, by direct implication, under those conditions where individuals have been separated from the means necessary to secure their subsistence (i.e. by being born into a condition where they do not have ready access to the means of subsistence through farming, husbandry etc. in an agricultural setting; or when they have been separated from the means of production in an industrial setting), the government shares some responsibility to create conditions of full employment (even by artificial means which are unrelated to the labor market). And, to the extent it is unable to accomplish this, it must attempt to absorb surplus workers by providing some form of "artificial" employment, at government expense.

Especially given the current geopolitical instabilities, the military is a logical means by which the government can artificially increase the level of employment, even as this will contribute to some tightening of labor markets, and may thereby marginally contribute to inflation. And, as long as one vacancy remains unfilled in the military, there can be little excuse for dispensing of public assistance (not including unemployment benefits and similar classification of government benefits for shorter term unemployment). De facto, the military is the biggest make work program that the government has going for it. Yet, under conditions of extreme economic adversity, even the military may not be able to provide the number of jobs that are needed. In this case, the government must assume responsibility to provide a subsistence wage for all who have demonstrated a "willingness to work." And, those who receive such a valuable government benefit should be required to reciprocate. Specifically, individuals employed in make work programs should be required to attain a certain level of education as a condition of eligibility for their work. In rare cases, demonstration of a substantive mental or physical defect which prevents education and employment will confer entitlement to receive a subsistence income. These outline some of the basic economic rights and responsibilities of government to its citizens, and the basic economic duties and responsibilities of citizens to their government, as defined under natural law.

Rights and Responsibilities Relating to Religion Under Natural Law
The predisposition to wonder, to contemplate the nature of reality, the infinity of time and space, and ultimately, the tendency to contemplate the meaning of life are all aspects of the naturally occurring mental activities which fall under the category of transcendental thought. By extension, the tendency to develop transcendental belief systems which serve both ontological, psychological and social control functions is a universal human tendency and an important part of our nature as human beings. Such natural tendencies form the basis for what we have come to know as the "freedom of religion"  as a basic right under natural law. But, like all other freedoms, the freedom of religion is not an absolute, but must be subordinate to functional considerations. And although it is one of the most important rights, even this right can be proscribed according to the dictates of reason, and according to the needs of the species. These natural predispositions and tendencies of mind that give rise to religious freedom and that serve as the basis for the freedom of religious inquiry also serve to proscribe its natural bounds and direct its course. Like all other rights, freedom of religion is not an absolute right, but must be qualified by functional considerations. And, like other rights, it is subservient to the higher value of maximizing survivability, or the Prime Criterion. As such, a dysfunctional religion, or one which violates the dictates of reason, may be prohibited by the state.

Broadly, religious freedoms fall under the category of ideological rights. Ideological rights include the rights to communicate our beliefs as well as the right to form associations on the basis of our beliefs. Like all rights, these rights must be qualified by larger considerations of how their practice comes into potential conflict with the species interests. In fact, these beliefs are naturally limited by what is functional, or by knowledge of what is most likely to conduce to the maximization of the survivability of the species. And, a powerful argument can be made that our religious belief systems "as practiced" (and totally apart for our subjective beliefs) should be limited and confined to the most functional belief system (that belief system which actually will prove most conducive to the maximization of human survivability). The problem with the need to proscribe religious practices stems from the lack of consensus over exactly what constitutes the most functional belief system, or the one which is most likely to conduce to the maximization of the species interest over the longer term.

As they are currently understood in the context of the US Constitution, freedoms such as the freedom of religion are presumed to be subject to a certain standard of reasonableness. For instance, the freedom of religion does not extend protection to religious beliefs or practices which violate civil codes of conduct. The only "acceptable" practices must be naturally suited to complement these codes of conduct or they would be proscribed. Hence, even under our system of religious toleration only religious practices which are roughly consistent with the aims of the state (or at least those which are not in flagrant violation of our system of civil laws) are allowed. In short, what constitutes acceptable religious practice is, in the end, subordinate to civil authority. In our system of laws, civil authority establishes specifications for the bounds of religious tolerance and it does not extend its protections to actions which are manifestly dysfunctional, or those that would tend to bring harm to the community. But, while the proscription of acceptable religious practice is implicit in the US Constitution, under a truly functional and accurate system of natural law, it would be made explicit. Under an optimally rational system of natural law it would be directly tied to the functional consideration of how it related to the species interests. And, an optimally functional system of natural law would hold religious beliefs to a higher standard of rationality. Under natural law, the state would become actively involved in "grading" religious doctrines according to how well they "functioned" or how well they meshed with its overriding goals, and particularly, the goal of maximizing survivability.

Under an optimal system of natural law (one which is functional and based upon truth), the state would rank religious doctrines according to the degree to which they approached or departed from the Prime Criterion, or according to the degree to which they were conducive to the goal of maximizing survivability. Again, under a functional system of natural law, religious beliefs would be held to a higher standard of rationality. And, in fact, all religious beliefs would be subject to a critical functional analysis to determine which ones were and which were not most likely to be conducive to the long term welfare of the species  In short, under an optimal system of natural law, the civil authority would be more actively involved in grading or ranking transcendental belief systems which operated under its auspices and protection. The state would cease to be a largely neutral and indifferent beneficiary of the world's great religions and their religious doctrines, and it would become a partisan in favor of certain religious doctrines and against others, depending on how these doctrines ranked according to their functional qualities, or how they tended to advance or retard the interests of the species. Under an optimal system of natural law, the state would become more actively involved in specifying and grading the content of all religious doctrines, depending on how consistent these doctrines were with the Prime Criterion.

Under a functional system of natural law (or a system of natural law as it actually exists), the state can become a more active participant in evaluating and regulating religious doctrines, even as the subject of religion per se remains distanced from the normal operations of government. In its capacity as functional evaluator, the state can adopt a more active role without jeopardizing the separation of church and state. For, under natural law, the line of communication between the church and state would be one way. Church doctrine would effectively be subordinated to the service of secular goals. The state would merely specify those religious doctrines which were most consistent with its aims (primarily, the maximization of the survivability of the species). The state would hand down laws and, the "most functional religions" could be practiced under the auspices of the state much as is currently the case  The government merely creates the broad environment under which certain religious doctrines may flourish, and it will not allow any religious doctrine to flourish which violates its laws.

In the United States for instance, to a significant degree, the state is already engaged in the establishment of religion, to the extent that it defines those religious practices which are acceptable, and prohibits those religious practices which are in violation of its system of civil laws. Under its current constitution, religious doctrines are already subordinate to secular authority. The only religious practices that are allowed are those which do not violate our system of civil laws. Human and animal sacrifices are expressly prohibited. Only "civilized" religious practices (those which are consistent with the aims of the state and those that conform with its laws, are permitted. Thus, the alternative form of religious freedom under a functional system of natural law would simply take the state's involvement in religion a step further. The state would openly subject all religious doctrines to a functional analysis, or it would become more actively involved in grading and ranking religious doctrines according to how consistent they were with its secular goals. Under this more activist role, the state would make the lawfulness of religious practices contingent upon a certain level of rationality and functionality. Even with the state's active involvement in the evaluation and ranking of religious doctrines, it is likely that the religious practices of most Americans would remain unchanged to the extent that the most popular religious faiths (primarily Christian sects) already approach some very lenient standards for rationality.

Despite their inherent flaws and despite the irrationality of the more literalist interpretations, most Christian sects would pass the rationality test by virtue of their "relative" functionality vis a vis the less functional alternatives. Thus, even once the state has assumed a more activist role in the regulation of  religious doctrines under a rational system of natural law, most people would continue to be free to practice the religion of their choice, much as they do now. But rather than encompassing all the worlds great religions, as it does now, the state would effectively begin to favor those doctrines which demonstrated a higher degree of rationality. For instance, the state might might give a free pass to various Christian denominations, much as it does now, and it might also give a pass to certain religious doctrines of the Far East, such as Zen Buddhism, which, surprisingly, has a number of functional parallels with Christian doctrine, and can even be used as a complement to Christian teaching. Under an optimal system of natural law, the range of acceptable religious doctrines would simply be reduced to those doctrines that are optimally functional, or those which were most likely to prove maximally conducive to the survivability of the species.

Under an optimally functional system of natural law, the state would cease to be an impartial observer and would become more of an active participant in the moral development of its citizens. It would begin to embrace Rousseau's idea that the state shares responsibility for the moral development of its citizens, and that it must help to establish conditions which are conducive to the moral improvement of its citizens. And, under the direction of functional considerations, the state would, in some degree, begin to distance itself from the Lockian idea that statecraft is not soulcraft. The secular state would assume this more activist stance where religion (including secular moral philosophies) is concerned with the knowledge that the moral constitution of its citizens will impact the social fabric and integrity of the civil order, and that the two cannot be neatly separated. This exercise would not extend so far as to constitute a breach of the establishment clause, in the case of the US Constitution. It would not create a single state religion. But, it might easily extend to the point where the state would become involved in functionally ranking religions (it might be more tolerant of religions which rank higher on its valued criteria and less tolerant of those which rank lower on it valued criteria, even as the basic freedom to practice religion is protected). The state does this already, in some degree, by not allowing religious practices which violates its civil codes, as in case of polygamy.

Natural Rights and Responsibilities Related to Education
The right to enhance knowledge through education is a basic right derived from the individuals' right to increase their survival chances by acquiring the knowledge that is necessary to master their environment. The right is predicated on both the ability to learn and the value that learning contributes to individual and collective survivability. And, it is predicated on curiosity or the "need for cognition" which is a primary cognitive trait. Collectively, these cognitive abilities and related survival rights translate into the "right to learn or to acquire useful knowledge." As such, the right to receive an education is one of the most basic rights.

In the United States, a number of problems surround both the rights and the responsibilities of education. These problems are threefold. They are related to money, ideology, and norms. Problems related to money derive from the fact that the system of education has constituted itself as an economic interest, when in fact it should be completely subordinate to the aims and direction of government and of the people. Teaching is a professional government job that pays far above the amount that is required for subsistence. No one has a natural right to such a job. Anyone who holds such a job should understand that they serve at the pleasure of the state, and, by extension, at the pleasure of the people. As with all public employee unions, teacher unions should merely serve in a subordinate and advisory capacity to the state. This is the remedy for the money problem within public education.

At the university level, there is the problem of a lack of ideological diversity. Specifically, the social sciences are largely dominated by cademics who have sympathies with the ideological left. Many of the professors in the social sciences came of age in the 1960s and, unfortunately, many of them have not mellowed with age, but have retained their youthful radicalism. Ideally, the social sciences, and all sciences would be dominated by synthesists, who reject both polar ideologies in their monolithic forms. This is the answer to the ideological problem within public education.

And finally, there is a problem which educators are largely powerless to correct; and that is the problem with the quality of the students themselves. Students in the United States are not socialized to attach the same level of urgency to education as students from other countries, particularly countries in the Far East. Partly because most of them have never experienced severe material deprivations, most do not fully appreciate the connection between education and their future prospects. Most do not see that becoming educated to the best of their ability is both a responsibility to society and to themselves. Most are not able to see that education will be critical to their life chances. Consequently, most fail to treat education with the seriousness that it deserves. This failure is traceable to norms.

The method for transmitting functional norms from parents to children is much more diffuse in the United States than it is in countries in which parenting practices tend to be somewhat more authoritarian. Children are also socialized to behave more deferentially towards their parents in many other countries, which tends to facilitate their education. Because of the "cult of unrestrained freedom" in the United States, children are inclined to reject the regimentation and discipline that are required to gain proficiency in more difficult subjects such as math and science. In addition, many parents have dysfunctional norms themselves, and these often get passed on to their children. Many parents have simply abdicated their responsibilities as parents, mainly by allowing the popular culture to exert an inordinate influence on their children's development. Under the best circumstances, parents would largely quarantine their children from the popular culture until they have reached the age of 18. This is not an unrealistic expectation in a highly regimented learning environment. In the absence of such a quarantine, the "normal exposure" to the popular culture will tend to stunt children's cognitive development, and it will prevent them from being able to perform on a par with students from countries in which the influence of popular culture is less pervasive.

As far as the educational responsibilities of adults are concerned, the citizen has an obligation to seek out and master the most functional  knowledge base. More specifically, citizens have an obligation to obtain knowledge that spans a "unified field." This includes essential knowledge of the natural world (principally, the rudiments of chemistry, biology and physics) and essential knowledge of man's social world (principally politics, economics, sociobiology, social psychology etc.). And although the obligation to master political knowledge may seem to be an individual political responsibility, it is just as appropriate to discuss this responsibility in the context of education.  Specifically, the people have an educational responsibility to become politically competent. They have an obligation to learn about basic political institutions and processes as a condition of citizenship, in order to make informed political decisions, and in order to legitimately grant consent to be governed.

Reproductive Rights and Responsibilities Under Natural Law
As the reproductive drive is among the strongest natural drives, it provides the basis for a distinct category of rights and responsibilities under natural law. It is the state's responsibility to insure that this drive is functionally channeled, or channeled in a way that is consistent with the community's welfare, and which is designed to meet important societal goals. Towards this end, the state may proscribe the proper bounds of sexual behavior, and it may prohibit any kind of sexual behavior which is inconsistent with the broader aims of the community, and with the interest of the species. And, it may banish those who demonstrate a propensity for such behavior.  Properly, it is the responsibility of individuals to regulate their own sexual behavior in a manner that is consistent with the interest of the species. But, failing this, it becomes the obligation and the right of the state to enforce sexual behavior or to channel the reproductive drive in a way that conduces to the welfare of the community.

Rights and Responsibilities Related to Population Control Under Natural Law
The state's responsibility to regulate reproductive behavior in a manner that is consistent with the interest of the species extends to population control. Specifically, to optimize the standard of living and the quality of life of its citizens, and to insure that populations remain at levels that can be sustained without imposing undue stress on the environment, it is the state's prerogative under natural law to establish population ceilings, to regulate the rate of population growth, and to engage in population control generally. By means of a system of incentives and penalties, the state has the means to insure that populations remain at, near, or below the population ceilings that it establishes to meet the foregoing aims. Population ceilings will depend upon many factors.

For instance, in countries such as Russia, which are losing population, the state has a mandate and an obligation to offer its citizens the necessary economic incentives to have larger families. Conversely, in the United States, the state has every reason to want to limit its population growth for the purpose of preserving its standard of living and its quality of life. Towards this end, it should propose a system of penalties to encourage every couple to have no more than three children. It is the individual's responsibility to insure that the population ceiling is maintained for everyone's benefit, and to adjust their reproductive activities accordingly.

The need to control population growth is manifest under natural law. But, there are acceptable means of population control which do not offend the moral conscience (such as contraception). And, there are means of population control which do offend the moral conscience (such as abortion and homosexuality). Population control is readily within our means, given the normal practice of contraception to control births. The great utility of the technological intervention of contraception to control population growth is that it allows us to postpone procreation until we are either economically able to provide for offspring as family units, or until a population deficit presents us with the opportunity and responsibility to have children. A failure to employ contraception to achieve these ends is tantamount to a failure to use reason and knowledge to maximize our survivability as a species.

Rights and Responsibilities Relating to Eugenics
There are several subcategories of rights and responsibilities related to eugenics under natural law. First, there is the subcategory of genetic rights of the unborn. This basically refers to the the right of the unborn to have some reasonable assurance that they will be substantially free from genetic defects which might prevent them from becoming viable members of society. In addition, there is the right of the unborn to life itself, under normal circumstances, and in the absence of an alternative compelling state interest which would be sufficient to override this right.

Another important subcategory of natural law rights and responsibilities is designed to insure the preservation of human subgroups which have evolved distinctive characteristics. Basically, these subgroups correspond to what are more commonly known as "the races of man." As a matter of natural law, these subgroups are entitled to preservation. This is the primary right under this subcategory. As the primary responsibility under this subcategory, we are bound to propagate in ways that will tend to maintain the integrity and diversity of human subgroups with distinctive genetic characteristics which correspond to race. In short, as members of subgroups with distinctive racial-genetic characteristics that are worthy of preservation, we have a right to preservation, and we have an obligation to prevent miscegenation.

The Regulation of Sexual Behavior Under Natural Law
What rules governing sexual behavior can we naturally extrapolate from the most representative sexual behavior among human beings? What principles or values can we extrapolate from these net natural behavioral tendencies in terms of natural law principles? Because of its private, consensual nature, should the state even have a say in what sexual practices are acceptable. Or, should we allow broad sexual freedoms between consenting adults? Although it is the nature of sexual activity to be private and consensual, it is not without public consequences, or consequences which affect the community, and which have implications for the survivability of the species. On these accounts, it is the prerogative of government to set the general tone and demeanor for acceptable sexual conduct.

The need for statutes governing sexual behavior is manifest in such forms as incest laws and age of consent laws. And while there should ideally be great uniformity in these laws, a least where age of consent laws are concerned, different societies have established different standards. These differences in standards are largely related to the average age at which advanced sexual awareness occurs in different societies. Some societies assign a high priority to sex education at a relatively early age. Consequently, individuals in these societies will become more sexually aware at an earlier age. In general, adolescents who have undergone sex education could presumably give informed consent while those who had not undergone such education could not give such consent. As a general rule, and in most cultures, there is a minimum age at which sexual behavior can occur between consenting minors.

As a practical matter, the age of consent varies between societies depending on the average sexual awareness of individuals in the society. But, to be effective, a law cannot be made on a case by case basis and an absolute age threshold must be established below which it is illegal to have sexual intercourse. Such laws range from a very liberal standard (age 12 in Denmark) to a far more conservative standard in the United States (age 18 in some states). The median age of 15 is a fair standard. Again, our average behavioral predispositions and sexual proclivities should be instructive, and should guide us in determining the bounds of acceptable sexual behavior.

Aside from establishing the minimum age at which sexual intercourse can legally occur between minors, the category of natural law devoted to the regulation of sexual behavior will also be concerned with laws governing what constitutes acceptable sexual behavior between adults.  A major requirement for such laws is that they should be generally conducive to the formation of stable, monogamous, heterosexual relationships which makeup the normal biological kinship unit for procreation and socialization of the young. In short, laws regulating sexual behavior should be conducive to the formation of conventional family relationships. From the standpoint of procreation and socialization of the young, such relationships clearly emerge as the ones which are most functional. Such relationships also emerge as being most natural for most people. By contrast, civil unions between homosexuals constitute an unnatural arrangement which is in violation of natural law.

Here we arrive at one of the most important prohibitions of sexual behavior, at least among a people who seek to follow a doctrine of natural law. From the standpoint of natural law, homosexuality is a behavior which is a sexual aberration. It is a form of sexual behavior which is atypical and unrepresentative of the net temperamental and behavioral predispositions of the species. If the predisposition towards homosexuality had evolved to be a more common form of sexual behavior, or if it had become a behavior which was more typical of the species, it would have rendered the species far less survivable. In all probability, a species with homosexual proclivities would have already become extinct. Hence, in the main, evolution would tend to select against this trait. Thus, heterosexuality emerges as the more functional and natural behavior. It is the form of sexual behavior which is most characteristic of the species, and the one which is most consistent with the goals of propagation and socialization of the young. It is the form of sexual behavior which is most conducive to the survival of the species, and the form which has greatest sanction under natural law.

Owing to the secretive nature of sexual activity among humans, the state cannot hope to regulate or control sexual deviance, except as it comes to its attention as an overt matter. Therefore, under a functional system of natural law, the state is simply obligated to create an environment which is optimally favorable for the development and expression of normal heterosexual proclivities, and an environment which discourages the development or expression of homosexual proclivities. Homosexuality should be regarded as a form of sexual deviance. Even as those who practice homosexuality may appear to inflict no direct harm on society, to the extent that their sexual behavior were to become normalized, or mainstream, it would potentially pose a serious threat to society. For, when people enter into sexual relationships primarily for orgiastic benefits, and without a more noble aim in mind, individually, their actions may be of little consequence. But, in large numbers, their actions can prove very destructive. On these accounts principally, homosexuality is deemed to be in contravention of the Prime Criterion.

The argument that any form of behavior which takes place between consenting adults and which result in harm to neither should not be proscribed, is a logical fiction. The actions of individuals cannot be neatly divorced from their impact on society. Virtually all personal actions  have extended consequences on society. By extension, they have consequences for the species and are related to the Prime Criterion. If our ancestors decided to practice homosexuality purely for its hedonic value, our species would have become extinct. Any behavior that individuals choose to engage in which could result in harm to the species if it were universally practiced, is, by definition, dysfunctional and in opposition to the Prime Criterion. Again, the welfare of the state and of the species cannot be neatly divorced from the private behavior of individuals. Just because an act takes place between adults who have given their consent to one another does not escape the issue.

We are all bound by duty to serve the best interest of the species or to act in such a way that it will result in the greatest benefit for the species. This duty extends to the exercise of our sexual freedoms as well. If what is done in private does not tend to further the welfare of the species, such behavior cannot be sanctioned by the state, even though it may have the consent of all the parties involved. If individuals wish to live in a society and receive its benefits they must defer to its normative prohibitions. If they are unwilling to do this, they must seek to live elsewhere where no such prohibitions exist. They must leave and create a state of their own where there perversions are permitted, and where they can enjoy the protection of "their" state. The whole purpose of a community and a nation state is to define a regime based upon certain values.

A regime defines itself according to certain values and it can banish those who refuse to live in accordance with its values. This is the essence of the idea of a community in the classical Greek sense. A community includes people who hold certain values that the community regards as functional and it excludes people who hold values which it regards as dysfunctional. A community promotes certain values that it deems to be maximally functional, and it is intolerant of values which it deems to be less functional. According to the values which the community adopts, certain behaviors will be permitted and other behaviors will be prohibited. In functional terms, or in a state created on the basis of natural law, the consequences of individual behavior always relate back to society in some way. By contrast, a state might be founded on the basis of some alternative set of principals, such as hedonism. In such a state any form of perverse behavior might be permitted, because, by its very nature, the regime would not have optimal functionality as its principal aim. Rather, it might have the maximization of individual pleasure as its principal aim. Such a state would have adopted a parochial goal (one which is focused on the self and which regards self gratification as the foremost aim in life), as opposed to a state that adopts a secular goal, such as maximizing the survivability of the species.

Homosexuality offends traditional norms regarding acceptable sexual behavior in the United States. These norms reflect the predominating sexual proclivities of the vast majority, or the form of sexual behavior which is most typical of the species. This is the form of sexual behavior which is maximally conducive to the survivability of the species. If the predisposition towards homosexuality is genetic, and there is some evidence that it is, then from the standpoint of evolution, which tends to favor traits which are functional and maximally conducive to the survivability of the species, homosexuality is anomalous. It could be argued that a certain incidence of homosexuality is programmed into the
species in order to reduce the competition for mates among male heterosexuals, thereby reducing ambient tensions within a society. But, because homosexuality occurs in males and females in roughly equal proportions, this thesis does not appear supportable. On the other hand, there is the thesis that homosexuality is mainly the result of dysfunctional environmental influences.

Experiments have shown that homosexuality among rat populations tends to increase as a result of their overcrowding. And, there is some suggestion that a similar result may occurs in human populations as a result of overcrowding.  But, whatever the major cause, homosexuality emerges as an aberrant and undesirable form of sexual behavior. If it had been the norm, or even if it had been substantially more prevalent in our prehistory, the survivability of our species would have been substantially reduced. And, in times when the heterosexual procreative instinct is most needed (as when populations may be drastically reduced following manmade or natural disasters), and even given its relatively low incidence, homosexuality would tend to marginally decrease the recovery capability of the species. Hence, when considered in the context of the full range of its dysfunctions, and in the context of its implications for the species, homosexuality is a violation of natural law.

The Natural Right of Self Defense
The rights of self defense and violence are inextricably linked. If someone invades my home for the purpose of doing harm to me or my family, including damage or theft to my property, under natural law, I have a right to terminate the threat, by any means, including the use of lethal force. One should not attempt to construe from this that we have a natural right  to inflict injury upon others out of mere natural inclination. Rather, we must have the sanction of reason. There are established conditions, and there are 'conventions arising from nature', which proscribe and limit  my activities in a society, including my resort to violence. I cannot randomly or arbitrarily harm others, even if it is my natural inclination to inflict such harm. It is likely that if I had such an inclination, it would be the result of a personal defect and, on this account, it would not be truly representative of an underlying temperamental propensity which was typical of the species generally. It is likely that even though such an inclination might be "natural" for me, it would constitute an aberration of what is typical of the species. Explaining the occurrence of such aberrations as a result of nature, and attempting to reconcile them with natural law can be difficult, but basically, the following arguments hold.

To begin with, individual aberrations cannot serve as an adequate basis for natural law. Natural law is based upon average or "net" cognitive and temperamental propensities, or those which are most representative of the broader species temperament, and which are predominant as "evolved tendencies." Only such natural "net" proclivities or those which are true of the species as a whole can serve as the basis for natural law.  An individual's aberrant actions may just be a case of defect or a case of natural randomization which results in a certain incidence of dysfunctional behaviors in the general population. Such behaviors should be suppressed and eliminated as they become apparent and known to those who clearly have superior judgment in the determination of such matters (principally, competent civil authorities). A certain number of defects and natural variations are bound to occur in the general population. It is the purpose of a eugenics program to identify and evaluate natural variations on the basis of informed reason, in order to serve the Prime Criterion.

Many look upon human defects and ask why would God allow such defects to occur? First of all, nature (and, by extension, God) does not initially judge what is defective. Nature's primary purpose is to generate variations per se. Only some of these variations will provide organisms with an adaptive advantage when exposed to certain environmental conditions. Nature does not presume to know beforehand which variations will prove most adaptive and which will function best in a given environment. The "defects" or the failures to be adaptive are not evil; they are simply variations which will prove to be maladaptive in response to a set of environmental challenges, or maladaptive outright. Those traits which tend to confer survival advantages and which have become representative of the underlying temperamental makeup of the species more generally are likely to be functional. A desire to indiscriminately inflict violence on others would obviously not be functional, and such behavioral tendencies would tend to get weeded out in the process of evolution. But, as evolution will throw up some variations that are not functional, there will be isolated cases in which individuals do have tendencies which are dysfunctional for the species. Natural law is not build around such exceptions. It is designed to account for and to reflect the average and most representative underlying dispositional makeup of the species. If such maladaptive traits were representative, the human race would not have been as successful as it has been, and may not have even survived.

To maximize the survivability of one's group and to maximize the probability of perpetuating the genes of one's group, humans evolved to be generally cooperative and communicative. Asociability or antisocialbility are atypical. There will be conflicts and competition between groups. But, these conflicts tend to confirm the pattern of human sociability as much as they challenge it. For most conflicts between groups require a high degree of cooperation within one's own group. Yet, from what we have already learned, there is no denying that we evolved a dual nature. We evolved the capacity to be violent against outgroups that we may be forced to compete with over vital resources. And we evolved the capacity to be social and cooperative to maximize the survivability of the ingroup. Behaving sociably is more natural within our ingroup. Behaving violently is more characteristic of our relations with outgroups, Both capacities evolved as survival expedients. Both capacities are integral parts of human nature. As an extension of our survival rights, and when threatened, we have a basic right to include violence as our self defense mechanism of last resort. The natural right of self defense does not extend to those who are acting in a manner which is inconsistent with the interest of the species.

Natural Law Rights and Responsibilities Relating to the Xenophobic Response
Xenophobia has certain implications for the way in which societies are organized. In addition, certain rights and responsibilities logically follow from the xenophobic response. The evolutionary origins and functions of xenophobic response have been discussed extensively in Chapter 12 of the Xenophyte Perspective Concerning Natural Law and Ethics, and we will only deal with them summarily here. To reiterate, the xenophobic response evolved for the purpose of preserving certain characteristics which proved adaptive for human subgroups in the environments in which they evolved. The xenophobic response discouraged human subpopulations (which had already evolved traits which made them better adapted to survive in their home environment) from breeding with human populations which possessed traits which had not evolved to make them better adapted to the same environment. The xenophobic response manifested itself primarily as an aversive response to the perception of substantial differences in skin pigmentation, which corresponded roughly with differences in exposure to ultraviolet radiation of human subgroups. In short, light skin proved to be a relatively more valuable trait for Northern Europeans while dark skin was a more adaptive trait for those who live in Southern latitudes.

For the evolved traits of differences in skin pigmentation to pay their maximum dividends, a behavioral mechanism was needed to reduce the probability that a human subgroup (which had already acquired the level of skin pigmentation which made it best adapted to its home region) would breed with other groups that it might come into contact with, but which had not yet evolved these adaptive traits.  Hence, the xenophobic response evolved as an avoidance reaction to the perception of distinctive differences in others. If one perceived significant differences in others that one came into contact with, the differences, which would presumably make one less well adapted to one's home environment, would trigger an aversive response. At the very least, greater affinity would be demonstrated towards those who one perceived as being most similar to one's self, in terms of their appearance.

In the context of the xenophobic response, appearance was the signal, the trigger, or the genetic marker which says "like self is ok but unlike self is not ok." The xenophobic response evolved as a natural and functional affective and behavioral trait which, in conjunction with natural selection, contributed to the evolution of human subgroups with distinctive racial characteristics. These subgroups evolved distinctive traits because these traits made them relatively better adapted to the environmental challenges they would have faced in their home range. And, they evolved the xenophobic response (in variable degrees between subgroups) in order to retain these characteristics. But, what implications does this response have for the way we organize our societies today?

To begin with, as a major affective and behavioral dimension, the operation of the xenophobic response should be a major design consideration in the construction of human societies, and, on this account, it becomes a major topic of natural law.  Although its intensity may vary between subgroups, as long as it is pronounced in any one subgroup, it must be considered a major factor in the relationships between all subgroups. Again, this trait evolved for the singular purpose of preserving certain traits in a subgroup because these traits were adaptive. As such, the evolutionary origins and functions of the xenophobic response do not differ according to context, but remain regardless of context. Thus, the xenophobic response is a unipolar trait which can always be activated or elicited by the perception of significant visible differences in others. That is to say, the natural law principle which is extrapolated from the xenophobic response does not change with changes in context. By contrast, the appropriateness of expressing a trait like aggression tends to be contextually dependent.

The cues that we take from this response are comparable to the cues we take from our innate moral sense. There will be conditions under which the innate moral sense must be mediated by reason and knowledge, but the basic instructions which it suggests should never be ignored. The same can be said of the xenophobic response. Such unipolar tendencies provide us with a general sense of direction. They provide us with a basis from which principles and a course of action can be inferred. The singular important purpose which can be inferred from the xenophobic response is the need to preserve gene pools with distinctive characteristics which correspond to what we call race.

Though the xenophobic response does not normally manifest itself in the form of aggression towards those that we perceive to be different (it most commonly manifests itself as an avoidance reaction towards those we perceive as being different) it does have the potential to manifest itself in ways that are socially destabilizing. As such, it represents a source of underlying tension in all multiracial societies. On these grounds primarily, societies which do not recognize or appreciate the xenophobic response as a source of underlying instability are suboptimal, in violation of natural law, and are not maximally conducive to the survivability of the species.

The xenophobic response manifests itself routinely in the dominant patterns of association in multiracial societies. The most characteristic feature of these patterns of association is their tendency to be racially homogeneous. In their voluntary associations, people naturally prefer to associate with those who most closely resemble them in appearance, and those who are most proximately related to them genetically. The principle of inclusion on the basis of (the perception of) genetic proximity and exclusion on the basis of (the perception of) genetic dissimilarity is the defining characteristic of the xenophobic response. The continuing operation of the xenophobic response in multiracial societies is responsible for the fact that most intimate and frequent associations occur between people who are racially similar. Such patterns of association continue to be the norm despite the best efforts of our social engineers in Hollywood, and on Madison Avenue to alter these patterns of association, to bring them into closer accord with their artificial ideals.

Despite the best attempts of Hollywood and Madison Avenue to discourage normal patterns of association which are based on the xenophobic response, such patterns persist. In opposition to these normal patterns of association, Hollywood and Madison Avenue offer an alternative vision of the way patterns of association should be, according to their ideals. The techniques they use to counteract natural behavioral tendencies (which defy their ideals of what a multiracial society should be like), range from the depiction of interracial conjugal relationships to multiracial backyard barbecues. Despite such well meaning but misguided attempts by our self appointed social engineers to suppress or deny natural behavioral tendencies, the xenophobic response remains a strong underlying cause for a wide variety of social behaviors in multiracial societies.

Given our nature to experience xenophobia, given that the xenophobic response is part of our natural behavioral repertoire, what natural law propositions, rights or responsibilities can be extrapolated from this response? First of all, there is evidence that tolerance norms which might be used to counter the effects of the xenophobic response are difficult to acquire (Sullivan, Pearson and Marcus, 1979, et. al.). This is another way of saying that we are naturally predisposed to continue to experience the xenophobic response in some degree and in some form (and in response to the perception of significant racial differences) notwithstanding the best efforts of our social engineers to erase or suppress this response, in order to achieve their ideal of a multiracial society.  Because of the persistence and strength of the xenophobic response, we may strongly infer that societies should be structured so as to achieve the highest level of stability notwithstanding the operation of the xenophobic response. Correspondingly, we are inevitably led to the conclusion that, in order to optimize their stability, our societies should be highly racially homogeneous. At the very least, we must infer from the xenophobic response that the range of diversity within a society should be kept below a critical threshold (the point at which it is more likely to manifest itself in a socially destructive fashion). By extension, we are led to the conclusion that the ideal of the multiracial society is indefensible under principles of natural law, and that we must search for a new model for society. The  new model begins with the presumption that while absolute racial homogeneity is unnecessary to maximize the stability of a society, a relatively high level of homogeneity is required.

Even among those who acknowledge the legitimacy of the xenophobic response as an evolved trait, some will argue that, like the appendix, this trait no longer serves any useful purpose, and that it can be removed, suppressed or overwritten by socialization. While it is true that this trait can be overwritten with socialization, this ignores the point. The point is that that the xenophobic response is a potentially powerful latent  tendency which evolved as an integral part of our natures. And, as much as possible, societies should be constructed to be in accord with human nature. A social form which does not adequately account for such considerations in its design will not be legitimate from the standpoint of natural law.

Attempts at Stabilization by Civil Authorities in Multiracial Societies
The xenophobic response served an important eugenics function up to the point in human evolution where science and knowledge could supplement or replace its functions. Even once this point is reached, the xenophobic response remains an important part of our evolutionary legacy. As much as possible, social forms should be accommodative where natural responses are concerned. And, ideals about human relationships should not be designed to conflict with or suppress natural behavioral tendencies. The xenophobic response remains below the surface as a potential threat to social stability in multiracial societies.  But, its becoming a threat assumes its occurrence in a relatively pure state, or in a form which was relatively unmediated by reason and knowledge. And, no suggestion is being made here that the xenophobic response should not be mediated by reason and knowledge. All that is being suggested is that this response should be openly acknowledged and that the natural function which it was intended to serve should be respected, namely, the preservation of gene pools with distinctive characteristics. In light of this important function, in light of its continuing relationship to the stability of human societies; and in light of its consequent relationship to the survivability of the species, the xenophobic response must be a major design consideration in the way we build our societies. As such, it becomes an important dimension of natural law, Yet, in modern multiracial societies, it is all too obvious why civil authorities will attempt to deny or discount the importance of the human tendency to experience xenophobia.

Civil authorities in multiracial societies know that they have a major problem in the xenophobic response. And, the best way that they have found to deal with this problem is, first of all, to deny its existence. Secondly, they promote a universalistic philosophy that is aimed at muting the expression of this response. This philosophy emphasizes such themes as the "universal brotherhood" of man, it stresses our similarities as human beings, and it discounts and even attempts to delegitimize our racial differences. Civil authorities in multiracial societies will promote such themes as part of their ongoing strategy to stabilize a social order which is naturally unstable, and in order to deflect attention from the fact that multiracial societies are wrongly and unnaturally constituted to begin with. These authorities will deny any suggestion that a multiracial society is in any way illegitimate from the standpoint of natural law. These authorities would even suggest that people who hold xenophobic attitudes are "very bad people" who are not representative of mankind, and that the rest of society should denounce them. Civil authorities in multiracial societies pursue such strategies despite that fact that the xenophobic response is an ineradicable part of our evolutionary heritage which is designed to maintain gene pools with distinctive characteristics corresponding to race.

The civil authorities who are most concerned with suppressing the expression of xenophobic response would be among the first to deny that  such a response exists or has pervasive influences in multiracial societies. As far as they are concerned, they are merely engaged in a project to help people with "superficial differences" get along better with each other. These civil authorities would deny that the tendency to experience the xenophobic response should be a design consideration in the construction of our societies, and they have no conception of its relationship to natural law. These authorities would also deny that the xenophobic response is a natural behavioral tendency which is a major defining quality of our nature as human beings, and which serves certain functions that are valuable for the species. This leads us to ask: Given the innate capacity for the xenophobic response, and given knowledge of its evolutionary origins, could it be the case that a multiracial society (one in which all races have a co-equal status) is wrongly constituted to begin with?  Is it not possible that such a society could be grounded on abstract principles which are themselves in violation of natural law?  These questions will direct our search for natural rights and responsibilities related to the xenophobic response.

Rights and Responsibilities Extrapolated from the Xenophobic Response
From what has been revealed about the evolutionary origins and functions of the xenophobic response, we have found that the concept of race is not without merit. It is not the product of socialization, and it has deep roots in human biology. In short, the concept of race has substance and meaning. It is not ethereal or superficial, but it is fundamental to our nature as human beings. Racial differences are more than just skin deep differences in appearance. They extend to our temperaments, and to our cognitive capacities. They represent differences at a genetic level which pervade and define virtually every aspect of our being. For these reasons and for the reasons cited above, race should be an important consideration in the design of our societies. Specifically, our innate tendency to experience the xenophobic response tells us that in order to construct a society which is maximally stable, it should be highly racially homogeneous. Under natural law, there are other important purposes to be served by constructing societies that are highly racially homogeneous.

A society which attempts to minimize racial differences in its population will naturally be more conducive to the preservation of racial subgroups than a society which asserts that there is no natural basis for xenophobia and no particular value in preserving subgroups with distinctive racial characteristics. The former type of society is in accordance with natural law and the latter is a violation of natural law. The former promises to have greater inherent stability and promises to be more conducive to the preservation of human subgroups with distinctive racial characteristics. Conversely, the latter promises to be more unstable and to pose a greater threat to human subgroups. By extension, the former type of social organization is more conducive to the survivability of the species than the latter type. That is to say, the former type is in accordance with the Prime Criterion and the latter is in violation of the Prime Criterion.

Once again, the evolutionary origins and functions of the xenophobic response are worth reiterating. The xenophobic response evolved to preserve the distinctive characteristics of racial subgroups in order to make them better adapted to the environmental challenges they faced in the regions in which they evolved. Because it manifests itself as an aversive reaction to outgroups with different racial characteristics, the xenophobic response (even when rendered latent by socialization), must be a major design consideration in the construction of our societies. This is true not only from the standpoint of a desire to construct societies which have a maximum degree of internal stability, but also from the standpoint of constructing societies which will prove maximally conducive to the preservation of human subgroups. The level of racial homogeneity in a society thus emerges as a very important principle under natural law, and an important design consideration in the construction of a society. By contrast, ethnicity is not an important design consideration under natural law.

Where achieving racial homogeneity of a society is concerned, ethnicity is a meaningless distinction. Ethnicity is a cultural distinction as opposed to a racial-genetic one. Primarily on this basis, it is not an important design consideration in the construction of a society, from the standpoint of natural law. For the purpose of achieving a maximum degree of racial homogeneity in a society (to both maximize its internal stability and to insure the preservation of gene pools with distinctive characteristics), it does not matter if a society contains large proportions of ethnic Russians, English, Germans, Scandinavians or even Southern Europeans with a caucasian lineage. These ethnic groups all belong to the same (or extremely similar) human subgroup. As far as their potential to evoke the xenophobic response is concerned, these groups are virtually indistinguishable.

For example, people who are native to Russia, England, Scandinavia, Ireland (or even Spain, Italy or Greece) are virtually indistinguishable from one another. They are all members of the Caucasian race. And while there are even some noticeable differences in skin pigmentation between the Caucasian subpopulations in northern Europe and southern Europe, these differences tend to be relatively small (by comparison with other human subgroups) and are generally insufficient to evoke the xenophobic response. Hence, they are not a consideration under natural law. But, the fact that the xenophobic response is far more likely to be triggered by the perception of differences between highly dissimilar subgroups makes the racial homogeneity of a society a major consideration under natural law.

As a matter of natural law, it is my responsibility to acknowledge the existence of the xenophobic response and the functions for which this response evolved (i.e. the preservation of gene pools with distinctive characteristics). It is my responsibility to insure that society is constructed in accordance with natural law principles which emanate from this response. It is my responsibility to insure that the aims for which this response evolved are achieved, namely, the preservation of groups with distinctive racial characteristics. It is my further responsibility under natural law to insure that society is constructed in a way that is conducive to the preservation of all gene pools with distinctive characteristics. However, it would be wrong to extrapolate from the xenophobic response, or any related responsibilities, that I have a right to indiscriminately commit violence against other subgroups in order to secure my racial heritage. Under normal circumstances, my natural right extends to avoidance, but it does not extend to aggression, except in self defense, and in response to an aggression committed against me or members of my subgroup by members of another subgroup (race).

My right to commit violence would only have the sanction of natural law if a condition of war existed between my proximate gene pool and individuals who belong to other gene pools. However, under normal peaceful circumstances, I do have a right, as a matter of natural law, to insist that society is structured so that it maximizes my own survival and the survival of my proximate gene pool. I do have a right to insist that the society in which I live (and in which my subgroup is a majority), is designed to be maximally conducive to my safety, by minimizing the extent of its racial heterogeneity. Correspondingly, I have an interest in extending the same protections to other groups which are equally threatened when the design parameters for a society under natural law are violated.

These then are but some of the most basic rights and responsibilities which ultimately emanate from the xenophobic response and from the functions it was intended to serve in an evolutionary context, namely, the preservation of subgroups with distinctive racial characteristics (races). These rights and responsibilities highlight the need to structure our societies in ways that will take the greatest advantage of natural human behavioral tendencies. Not only does a society organized along such lines avoid xenophobia and resulting instabilities, but it will also be more conducive to noblese oblige. Social theorists like Jefferson knew this very well.

Further Implications of Xenophobia for the Organization of Society
Because this is the area of natural law that has what are among the most profound implications for the way that we organize our societies, additional attention will be devoted to its implications here.  First, it goes without saying that it is natural for us to have preferences for those who are most proximate to us genetically. We have a natural law right to show preference for others, solely on the basis of their innate traits. The more similar we perceive others, the more likely we are to show such preferences. This is not meant to suggest that differential preferences cannot be shown even towards members of one's own subgroup, on the basis of the perception of similarities and differences. For obviously there are variations which occur within subgroups. But the range of these variations tends to be relatively small by comparison with the range of differences which exist between subgroups. We are both conditioned and naturally predisposed to accept a certain range of diversity within our own proximate gene pool, or within our subgroup.

Within every subgroup there is a naturally occurring range of variability which will not tend to trigger the xenophobic response. The more that we perceive members of another group as being different, or the more that another group exceeds the range of diversity that we are inclined to accept within our own subgroup, the more likely it is to trigger the xenophobic response. For instance, the occurrence of blue eyes v. brown eyes and minor variations in skin pigmentation would not generally be sufficient to trigger the xenophobic response. These variations naturally occur within the same Caucasian gene pool. (Also because such variability is more characteristic of some subgroups than of others suggests that those groups in which there is a higher level of naturally occurring variation will tend to be more tolerant of minor degrees of variation than those subgroups in which there is greater uniformity of characteristics.) But, as the contrast in skin pigmentation and other differences becomes more pronounced, such distinctions are more likely to trigger the xenophobic response. Hence, prejudice or the xenophobic response which leads to prejudice becomes more likely in the degree that the natural range of genetic variation within a particular gene pool is exceeded.

Even among academics and highly educated elites who tacitly accept such arguments as those presented above, there is a tendency to believe that using education to overwrite our natural tendencies (when they come into conflict with their ideals) is the preferred course. This course is preferred in the eyes of social engineers as a strategy designed to overcome the potential for conflict inherent in a multicultural, multiracial society. The strategy proceeds from certain values which do not have sanction under natural law. Contemporary social engineers in multiracial societies place the avoidance of conflict above all else, and they are willing to subordinate the goal of gene pool preservation to this goal. They also have a vested interest in the premise that humans are malleable in a virtually infinite degree, and, therefore they can be shaped into whatever we want them to be. Sociologists in particular are quick to insist that all of what we are as human beings is culturally determined.

Our self appointed social engineers and social scientists are correct in their assertion that, principally by means of socialization, the natural tendency towards xenophobia can be "socially engineered" out of existence, or that its pernicious effects can be suppressed by education. But, the costs of their strategy to the species is great, and perhaps even beyond calculation. Who can put a price the loss of one's genetic heritage and indeed, on one's genetic essence? Moreover, their strategy neglects the question of how society should be organized in the first place so as to be most closely in accord with natural underlying tendencies, and with natural law. Their strategy ignores or denies the arrangements that would in fact be most consistent with natural law in favor of a whole set of artificial conventions. Their strategy ignores fundamental questions about the underlying stability of a society which is directly proportional to the degree to which it conforms with net human predispositions.

Contemporary social engineers apparently have no conception of how to construct a society so that it is most closely in accord with human nature and with natural law. And they appear to have no conception of what kinds of social arrangements would prove most conducive to the long term viability of society or the survivability of the species. They are far more concerned with how to make the existing society (with all its faults) work more smoothly and conform more closely to their ideals. Equally, they seem less concerned with the question of the natural level of stability and cooperative interaction of society, or with the possibility that such levels of stability and cooperative interaction tend to be maximized in the degree to which genetic diversity within a society is reduced to a level that occurs naturally in gene pools which have evolved in relative isolation from one another over long periods of time. To them, the problems of a multiracial society are not to be corrected by remedies which would conflict with their ideals, which are themselves in violation of natural law. Rather, they favor the suboptimal and even dysfunctional (in terms of aggregate species interests) solution in which they have a vested interest, namely, using socialization to suppress what they view as dysfunctional natural behavioral tendencies. In other words, by overwriting our natural behavioral predispositions with artificial conventions, contemporary social engineers hope to suppress those elements in our nature which are opposed to their ideals. These are the same ideals held by the majority of humanists.

According to the humanists' view of the world, even though it may be our natural condition to experience xenophobia in response to the perception of significant visible differences in others, this tendency can be suppressed by socialization. The mere fact that the expression of this trait can be suppressed means that whether it is a trait which is wholly heritable or partly conditioned is immaterial from the standpoint of our self appointed social engineers. These social engineers do not concern themselves with the larger question of the functions that might have been served or which might still served for the species by the xenophobic response. What matters most to these engineers is that we have the capacity to mute or to attenuate this tendency through education and socialization. We can use education to negate traits, or behavioral tendencies which "they" deem to be undesirable. In fact, having been so completely dominated by the tabula resa view of man, most social engineers do not even consider the existence of traits such as the xenophobic response.

It also never occurs to our social engineers that by attempting to suppress a naturally evolved behavioral tendency, we might be subverting some larger plan of nature, or some important purpose which is grounded in natural law. Contemporary social engineers merely focus on the fact that because we can do something through socialization that, ipso facto, we should do it. They proceed from a technical capability which is most consistent with their humanist values to the value that this technical capability (the ability to counteract natural behavioral tendencies through socialization, if such natural tendencies do exist) should be exercised. They see the possible existence of natural tendencies which are in conflict with their humanist ideals as a problem to be rectified by education and socialization, just as ignorance is a "naturally" occurring condition which can be overcome with socialization and education. But, in the one case, education and the infusion of knowledge is natural to our psyche and it is complementary to our cognitive development and to our survivability. By contrast, in the case of the xenophobic response, an attempt is being made to superimpose social conventions onto an aspect of our natures, in order to fulfill some ideal of what an unrepresentative group thinks humanity should be.

Implications of Findings for a System of Natural Law
The foregoing analysis has important implications for drafting constitutions and for our understanding of natural law. In the last century, the investigation of human nature via the social and behavioral sciences has been conducted on a scale and with an intensity that is unparalleled in human history. As a result, these sciences have revealed things about our cognitive, affective and behavioral characteristics that were beyond the reach of both the ancients and those who created the US Constitution (the founders). To the extent that the founders' ideas about human nature were not based upon science, it is difficult to believe that what science has revealed about human nature will not have important implications for the constitutions that we choose to live under. It is equally difficult to believe that what the sciences have revealed about human nature will not have important implications for our understanding of natural law.

To the extent that the founders had considerable practical understanding of human nature, we can be confident that the US Constitution already rests on natural law foundations, in some degree. Consequently, much of their work will not be invalidated by what science has revealed about human nature since the founding. Rather, it is likely that  what science has revealed about human nature since the founding will tend to corroborate certain elements of the Constitution all the more firmly. But, in other respects, science will have revealed things about human nature that were unknown to the founders, and which will have have implications for the Constitution, and for our laws more generally. In addition, contextual changes that have occurred since the founding (and which relate to survivability of the species) may demand that we place other values ahead of those which the founders thought were the most important in their own time. Hence, fundamental changes to the US Constitution may still be necessary in order to place the legal and political system of the US on terra firma with regard to natural law, and in order to serve the Prime Criterion.

Also, since the founding, there has been an enormous expansion in our knowledge. This knowledge relates directly to our survivability. Similarly, the world has become more interdependent than ever before. As a result, the public interest must be defined in considerably more  comprehensive terms than was true at the time of the founding. National policies must reference a much larger set of considerations, and, in effect, they must be designed to be consistent with the species interest.

Such developments suggest that a substantial modification of the US Constitution will become necessary. But what specific changes are suggested for either the US Constitution or systems of laws more generally? Assuming we have reached a point where we have a better understanding of natural law, or an understanding which is most consistent with the nature and the interests of the species, what changes in the US Constitution will become necessary? First of all, it is evident that, in order to be optimally functional and conducive to the maximization of our survivability, our system of natural law, including our constitutions, must be based on what science has revealed about human nature, rather than being based upon norms which are at least partly grounded in an incomplete understanding of human nature and of the species interest. Secondly, our system of laws must be contextually appropriate. It must fully account for the threats to human survivability in the existing environment. Third, it must fully account for and incorporate the knowledge we have to counter these threats.

What science has revealed about human nature alone can justify revisions of a revolutionary magnitude in our understanding of natural law. In fact, this knowledge can completely overturn the natural law tradition. The natural law tradition was built upon ideals that were closely tied to the sentiments and the imagination of an unrepresentative group. To place natural law on a rational footing, our ideas about natural law and about human nature must be based on the scientifically valid ideas of a representative group, and they must reference the species interest. The prevailing understanding of natural law is normatively based, and is steeped in humanistic sentiments. There is nothing wrong with a system of natural law that is normatively based, provided that the norms on which it is based do not arise purely from sentiment, and provided they can point to science for their justification. Yet, in their current state, not even the social sciences can be relied upon to produce the knowledge that is needed to place our system of natural law on a rational footing. For this purpose, we need knowledge that is substantively free from ideals that are grounded in sentiments, such as that which is being produced by the "behavioral" sciences.

As we have seen, the social sciences are affected by a systematic bias, or an ideological distortion which influences the focus of its research, the way in which its research is conducted, and the results it gets. As with other professional groups that have a close tangential relationship to politics, social scientists have an ideological agenda. Part of their agenda is legitimate and is grounded in facts and truth. And, part of their agenda is based upon their own natural sentiments, temperamental predispositions, experience, and their professional ethos and class interests. Hence, even as the social sciences are one of the main repositories of the knowledge we need to form a substantively accurate picture of human nature, we must be able to extricate this knowledge from the ideological matrix in which it is imbedded. By becoming more acquainted with the properties of ideology in general, and by becoming attuned to the nature of the ideological bias that affects the social sciences, we will stand a better chance of being able to neutralize its most inimical effects.

Having been alerted to the bias that affects the social sciences, and having cross checked knowledge in one area (the social sciences proper) with knowledge in another area (the behavioral sciences proper, especially the fields of sociobiology, ethology, behavioral genetics, evolutionary psychology, neurology, etc.), what is the nature of the major principles of natural law that have been revealed.? To begin with, once it has been freed from the influence of bias, the picture of human nature that unfolds takes us in the direction of some of the classical philosophers. This should have been expected all along. For instance, what the social sciences have revealed about human nature provides a substantive basis for the belief that all men are equals before the law, by virtue of their shared moral sense. Despite such contemporary works as the Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), which have been misinterpreted as a strike against our essential equality as human beings, our equality as human beings is upheld by science as never before. Our essential equality can be traced to a rough equivalency in our qualities as moral beings, and to the fact that, on average, we appear to have something approximating an innate moral sense.

Even without the aid of modern scientific research methods and instruments, Jefferson seems to have been on the right track when he attributed a "moral sense" to human beings, as did Kant before him. And even as we cannot accept either Jefferson's or Kant's views in their totality, there is much in their work and in the work of other philosophers that we can use as reference points to improve our understanding of human nature. However, with the help of science, our current understanding of man has gone so far beyond what even these thinkers could have known about human nature. Yet, once again, what science has revealed about human nature has in some degree been kept hidden or suppressed by the ideology which has come to pervade the social sciences themselves. If the ideas of human nature held by Kant and Jefferson were bordering on idealistic, then the ideas of human nature proffered by the majority of social scientists are idyllic in the extreme. These social scientists and radical social engineers reiterate the malleability of mankind, and they stress the capacity of socialization to make mankind into anything we want him to be. And, this is just the problem. We should not insist that mankind become something that he is not inclined to be naturally.

To attempt to cast man in such an unnatural mold is the most egregious violation of natural law. We should not insist that man live in social arrangements which are not maximally in accord with his nature. For, to the extent that man's nature is a product of evolution (and, by extension, a product of God) to create any social arrangements which are counter to our naturally prevailing behavioral tendencies is an affront against God. Rather, we should insist that man live in social arrangements which are maximally in accord with his nature. Forms of social organization which have the sanction of nature are more likely to prove maximally conducive to human survivability. Evolutionary theoretical models bear this out. Man evolved the traits he has because they were generally conducive to human survivability. In short, man evolved these traits because they were functional. That which is functional is conducive to the survivability of the species. That which is conducive to the survivability of the species is in accordance with divine will.

We should be alerted to the capacity of  socialization to overwrite our natural tendencies and to lead us astray. Realizing this, it is more important than ever that we use all the methodological rigors that science has made available to us to better understand our own natures. Because those who control the process of socialization have some capacity to superimpose onto human nature a false set of ideals which reflects their own unrepresentative temperaments and corresponding set of values, it becomes all the more necessary to insure that socialization takes place in a manner that tends to reinforce our average or "net" predispositions. As a reflection of the sum total of our evolved capacities, it is these predispositions which will most likely prove conducive to our survivability under a broad range of circumstances and in response to a broad range of environmental challenges. When a system of laws is opposed to natural tendencies, it is also opposed to the purposes for which these natural tendencies evolved. Correspondingly, a system of laws or a form of social organization which is contrary to our nature can be expected to reduce our survivability accordingly.

When socialization is in the hands of ideologues who proceed from an unscientific and erroneous concept of human nature, we should not expect that the survivability of the species will be maximized. Socialization can be pirated by a species subgroup or a group of men for their own selfish ends, to the detriment of the species. Based upon our awareness of this possibility in the future, or this actuality in the present, we can take the steps that are necessary to bring our institutions into accord with natural law. By maintaining a constant awareness of the dynamics that tend to play out between personal interests and suboptimal ideologies on the one hand, and the species interest and natural law on the other hand, we can spot whenever laws begin to deviate from what is natural; in order to achieve some artificial purposes which have neither the sanction of nature nor of divine will. Forming such an awareness is not beyond the capabilities of the average person. But, it does require them to make an investment in their critical thinking skills, if an adequate dividend for society is to be expected.

Thus, man's nature cannot fit neatly into the tabula rasa view upon which many educational and other models are premised. Once again, socialization does have the capacity to overwrite and override many natural tendencies. But, once overwritten, these tendencies are always just below the surface waiting to erupt under the right circumstances. As such, when social arrangements and conventions are not in accordance with natural tendencies, these tendencies represent important ongoing potential sources of instability in society which cannot be ignored. Hence, we must ask the question of the degree to which it is advisable that this should be done, versus the degree to which we should attempt to structure our social arrangements to come into closer harmony with our natural behavioral tendencies as much as possible. The latter strategy will prove more stable and enduring, for it does not depend upon human conventions to impose stability through artificial means, but draws its strength instead from natural human tendencies.

There is an underlying natural order present in the universe, and we are given reason, not sentiment, to discern this order. Our survivability will tend to be enhanced in the degree that we correctly understand our own nature as a product of this order, and in the degree that we attempt to bring our social, economic, political, legal and theological institutions into accord with this order. Hence, we are morally bound to use reason to further our understanding of our own nature (in the context of its evolutionary origins and functions) and to bring our institutions into closer accord with our nature. And, we can have some confidence that what science has revealed about our own evolution clearly suggests that superior strength and enhanced survivability are naturally more closely associated with truth and with interpretations of the natural order that are more factually based. Strength and survivability are more closely associated with apprehending the natural order as it actually is, rather than with how some groups might like it to be.

Knowledge of human nature and principles of natural law that have been extrapolated from this knowledge must eventually be brought to bear on our social, economic, political, legal and theological institutions to determine whether they achieve an optimal form, or a form which is most closely in accord with our nature, or whether they continue to reflect ideals that are fundamentally at odds with human nature. From this point, the world of practical politics must ultimately determine whether we will be on a course that parallels natural law, or one which departs from it.
 

COPYRIGHT 2012 BY ALEX VAN ALLEN