Evolution endowed man with "two cognitive and temperamental poles," or two sets of opposing tendencies and capacities to enhance his survivability over a broad range of conditions. Certain values, attitudes and beliefs tend to be more closely associated with one cognitive and temperamental pole than the other. And, in an attempt to remain true to the full repertoire of tendencies and capacities that we have been endowed with by our evolutionary legacy, we need to rely on values that are more closely associated with both poles as reference points in modeling human societies. If we choose to model our societies on the basis of values that are more closely associated with only one pole, to the near total exclusion of values that are more closely associated with the other pole, the resulting social form will tend to be unstable, and more prone to experience some kind of disintegration or collapse over the longer term.

If a belief system is based more or less exclusively on values that are more closely associated with one pole of human cognitive and temperamental essence, that belief system will give a distorted account of human interests and it will not prove maximally conducive to human survivability over the longer term. According to these criteria, liberalism and conservatism are both distorted ways of understanding human interests. For both belief systems tend to be dominated by values that are more exclusively associated with either one or the other pole of human cognitive and temperamental essence, or with one or the other pole of human nature, and which fail to adequately account for values that are more closely associated with the opposite pole. As such, and when standing alone, liberalism and conservatism reflect only part of human nature. Conversely, a more synthetic view will stand a better chance of being able to capture the totality of human interests and tendencies.

According to the view that is now prevalent in the "social" sciences, because socialization has such an important influence on our development, there is no need to assess how close or how far our values or ideals might be to anything that could constitute human nature. Yet, in the degree that this "blank slate" has a certain texture, and in the degree that this texture can "show through" the effects of socialization, then we cannot just conveniently dismiss it. Our preexisting "nature" should be an important consideration in whatever values, principles or ideals we form or adopt. For, in the degree that the values, principles or ideals that we form or adopt are not compatible with the most important elements of human nature, the resultant social form will tend to be unstable.

Being composed of abstractions of which we are incapable at birth, it would be impossible for us to be born with belief systems. But, we can easily be born with the precursors of such belief systems. We can be born with cognitive or affective tendencies that will predispose us to form or adopt certain values, ideals, or belief systems when we are exposed to a certain environmental matrix, or a certain set of environmental variables. And, even as the environment can play an important role in "flipping our switches" in a certain direction, it is our innate differences that determine our "initial switch settings." Here again, the social scientist's main argument for the power of socialization must be qualified.

Given that we are born with innate predispositions to form or adopt certain values and beliefs when exposed to a particular set of environmental variables, or given that we are born with cognitive, affective and behavioral predispositions which vary from one individual to the next, and which correspond to what has traditionally been thought of as "human nature," the normal range of variation in these predispositions that occurs within and between human populations becomes an important consideration in the quest to better understand human nature.

The behavioral sciences have been revealing that there is a normal range of variation in cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies (the essence of human nature) within human populations, and between them. And, it is this normally occurring range of tendencies (those tendencies that are most representative of human beings within a particular population, as well as between populations), that we will be most concerned with in our attempts to identify what constitutes human nature at the aggregate or the species level. Once we have identified the defining features of human nature, it then becomes possible to extrapolate principles that we can then use as a basis for a system of natural law.

Along with what the behavioral sciences have been revealing about human nature, evolutionary theory and evolutionary biology also suggest that the optimal or most functional range or set of values will not neatly coincide with either the right or the left, but that it will contain elements of both. That is to say, to the extent that we evolved two temperamental poles, or two sets of "potentially" conflicting cognitive and temperamental tendencies, and to the extent that these poles are more closely associated with either liberalism or conservatism, then, evolutionary theory suggests that we should reference values associated with both poles in forming our overall perspectives or world views, in order to maximize our survivability at the aggregate or species level. Evolutionary theory further suggests that to the extent that an ideology is completely dominated by values that are more exclusively associated with either the left or the right pole, the resultant social form will tend to be unstable over time, and that it will not best equip people to respond to the broad range of environmental challenges they will likely have to face at one time or another at either a societal level, or at the aggregate/species level.

Accordingly, we have no more reason to suspect that conservatives are in a better position to advance an overall plan for society than liberals.  For conservatives are typically just as guilty as liberals of relying on values that are more exclusively associated with one pole, to the exclusion of values associated with the other pole. They are just as guilty as liberals of relying on their feelings as a source of their values and beliefs. To stand the best chance of being rational and serving human interests more generally, values and ideals should not be extrapolated primarily from "feelings" or from considerations of immediate self interest. Rather, they should be extrapolated from “knowledge” of human nature in combination with knowledge of the most serious challenges facing the species at a particular point in time.

Neither liberal nor conservative ideologies are legitimate from the standpoint of attempts to advance human interests more generally, because the values and ideals on which both of these ideologies have been based are unrepresentative of humanity. Because neither liberals nor conservatives hold values that reflect an understanding of the totality of human interests (human interests at the aggregate or species level) or because both groups hold values which reflect their own unrepresentative temperaments, cognitive abilities and interests, neither can serve as a legitimate basis for an optimal system of natural law. Even so, as both sides do reflect "some" legitimate human interests and tendencies, elements of both sides must be referenced in both our analysis of society, and in any system of natural law that we might wish to adopt. Although we should be concerned about the world views and values that are more closely associated with the poles or the extremities of the normal range (to the extent that they can reflect some legitimate human interests), it would not be advisable to allow a social, economic, political, legal and theological system to become completely dominated by values or ideals that are more exclusively associated with one or the other pole. And, to allow this to happen would be a betrayal of our evolutionary legacy and a betrayal of human interests more generally.

The Nature of Man as a Basis for Natural Law
Legitimately understood, natural law is that primary body of laws or first principles for organizing human societies that can be logically extrapolated from an understanding of human nature in the context of its evolutionary origins and functions. This understanding of natural law must be contrasted with the "natural law tradition" or the understanding of natural law as it has come to be known in association with Christian theology. The natural law tradition is affected by much the same kind of ideological bias that now pervades the social sciences. Along with the social sciences, the natural law tradition has been biased by values and sentiments which have a much closer association with one pole of human nature. This tradition rests on ideals about how certain groups would "like" humans to behave, rather than scientific knowledge of how they "do" behave. By contrast, a rationally constituted system of natural law is based on a scientific understanding of human nature, such as that which is now coming into view as a result of advances in the behavioral sciences. This understanding of human nature clearly suggests that a much more eclectic, synthetic and bi-polar system of values is the better basis for human societies.

Inventory of Essential Capacities and Tendencies
What does the picture of human nature that is now being revealed by the behavioral sciences look like, and how does it differ from the more idealistic and incomplete picture of man which continues to hold most liberals, progressives and humanists (as well as many conservatives), under its spell? What are the main human capacities and tendencies that should serve as the basis from which we can extrapolate our most fundamental principles, values and ideals? What are the fundamental principles, values and ideals that should determine the social forms that we would be willing to recommend or support, and which should serve as the basis for an optimal system of natural law?

The following is an inventory of essential human capacities and tendencies, or the main elements of human nature, that the behavioral sciences have been revealing. Although this inventory is not exhaustive, it does reflect the main tendencies of human nature that should be the most important considerations in the design of our societies. From this inventory we can extrapolate the system of principles, values and ideals (a system of natural law) that would provide the optimal foundations for human societies more generally. At once, this system would allow us to construct societal forms that would be most closely in accord with human nature, and that would also be most conducive to our survivability.

Most people will already be familiar with these essential human traits and tendencies, because they reflect what most people implicitly understood to be true of human nature, simply on the basis of their own personal experience. In many cases, the more recent findings in the behavioral sciences merely serve to corroborate what must people knew or strongly suspected to be true of human nature all along. These tendencies reflect what is true for most human beings, on average, or what tends to be true of human beings at the aggregate or the species level. These findings provide a rational basis from which to extrapolate an optimal and most functional belief system or ideology. And, it is important to note that, overall, this ideology is "synthetic." That is to say, what the behavioral sciences have been revealing about human nature does not tend to exclusively support either liberals or conservatives. Rather, it points us in the direction of a system of values that defies the liberal-conservative paradigm altogether.

Again, a system of natural law, or a set of basic rules for organizing human societies can be extrapolated from the better understanding of human nature that has been coming into view as a result of advances that been made in the behavioral sciences. These advances have been revealing a picture of human nature in the context of its evolutionary origins and functions. Accordingly, an inventory of the most basic natural human tendencies from which principles of natural law can be extrapolated includes the following.

1) SURVIVAL
The strongest human tendency is the desire to survive. (This includes such drives as hunger, thirst, as well as the desire to avoid pain, injury and
death etc.)

2) SEX
Next to the desire to survive, the strongest human desire (at least among normal healthy adults), is the desire to have sex, purely for the sake of pleasure, as opposed to any conscious desire to reproduce. As the most common and representative sexual tendency of the species, and as a tendency that we evolved because it was most conducive to our survival, humans are more naturally inclined to be heterosexuals. We evolved this tendency, and it became more representative of the species precisely because it is the tendency that has proven to be most functional and most conducive to our survival over the course of our evolution.

3) LANGUAGE ABILITY AND THE ABILITY TO REASON
The neurosciences have revealed areas of the brain (such as Broca's area) that are specifically devoted to the formation and use of language. Hence, man is naturally predisposed or "hard wired" to develop language and to engage in abstract thought on the basis of language. As an extension of this basic capacity, man is an innately sociable, communicative and political creature. And, once his basic needs have been satisfied (i.e. basic needs for food and water take precedence over contemplation and thinking abstractly), and in the absence of cultural factors that would interfere with this tendency, man has the capacity to think at a relatively high level of abstraction, merely as a consequence of his natural ability to use language, and his ability to reason in terms of language.

Note: Man's natural facility for language and his corresponding ability to think at a relatively high level of abstraction predisposes him to rank considerably higher on the “need for cognition” scale than prevailing patterns of media and information consumption seem to suggest. These patterns are being kept artificially low by cultural influences, the most important of which is the popular culture. In effect, the popular culture is "dummied down," ostensibly for the purpose of making it more entertaining and appealing to a broader and younger audience. Basically, the popular culture is sending people (young people especially) the message that "if you don't need to use your brain, why use it."

Given the availability of vast sums of knowledge via the internet and other media, the potential exists for the public's need for cognition to become much higher than it is. But, once again, cultural influences and prevailing norms are interceding to keep it artificially low. Under prevailing normative influences, people are more likely to opt for cognitively simple "sensation rich" stimulation, rather than use their cognitive space and abilities to store and process useful (or even vital) information about the world.

Mainly as a consequence of the popular culture, people have placed "feeling good" ahead of their moral responsibilities to acquire useful information about the world. Even though people can experience "feeling good" from the actual process of learning new and useful things about the world and the universe, under predominating cultural and normative influences, most people remain more likely to experience "feeling good" at a more hedonistic level, and primarily by means of sensations, sights and sounds. And, because the popular culture is a main source of these sensations, sights and sounds, it is also the main obstacle to their attainment of a higher and more natural need for cognition. That is to say, in its most prevalent forms, the popular culture is helping to propagate and reinforce norms that encourage people to be cognitive misers, or to rank lower on the need for cognition scale. This tendency has direct consequences for the social, economic, political, legal and theological forms of organization that people are willing to adopt or to tolerate. The lower that people rank on the need for cognition scale, the less likely they are to adopt more functional arrangements.

4) MAN IS A HIERARCHICAL CREATURE
Studies of our closest primate relatives as well as studies of our own behavior reveal that man is a hierarchical species that tends to organize his society along hierarchical lines. That is to say, man has a natural predisposition to evaluate others and to assign them a rank in a social hierarchy on the basis of these evaluations. Or, man has a tendency to judge others on the basis of whether or not they appear to possess traits that are valued by the community of which he is a part. Man engages in a process of ranking other members of society, or assigning them to social classes, depending on whether or not they possess certain valued characteristics. As a result, man naturally tends to form social hierarchies on the basis of these rankings.

5) MAN "NATURALLY" HAS XENOPHOBIC TENDENCIES
The behavioral sciences have revealed that man has evolved a tendency to experience a "xenophobic response" to the perception of significant visible differences in others, such as differences that correspond with race. This is a major behavioral tendency that should influence the way our societies are organized.

6) MAN HAS A NATURAL CAPACITY FOR REFLECTION AND A PREDISPOSITION TO ENGAGE IN TRANSCENDENTAL THOUGHT
Cross cultural anthropological studies, as well as studies in the fields of cognitive, social and behavioral psychology, have revealed that man shows a universal tendency to wonder. More specifically, he has a tendency to wonder about such things as the infinity of time and space, the ultimate purpose of his existence and the ultimate meaning of life. Relatedly, man has a natural capacity to engage in the kind of reflection, introspection and contemplative thinking that is closely associated with the formation and adoption of religious and philosophical beliefs. Or, man has a natural capacity to engage in what can be broadly termed "transcendental" thinking.

7) MAN IS MORE NATURALLY PREDISPOSED TO TO THINK "SYNTHETICALLY" THAN IN POLARIZED TERMS
Although man has bi-polar capacities, he is more predisposed to think in more balanced, symmetrical and synthetic terms. This is the stronger tendency among human beings at the aggregate or the species level. Man evolved this capacity for balance in his thinking because, even though he would have had to face extreme challenges for which tendencies that are more closely associated with one or the other pole of human nature would have been the more appropriate response, on average, he was more likely to find himself in situations that required a more balanced response. That is to say, over the course of his evolution, man was more likely to find himself in a situation that would have demanded a more affectively "neutral " response with regard to the poles. As a result, this became the more representative tendency of the species. The capacity for synthesis, or the ability to maintain a balance between tendencies associated with the cognitive and temperamental poles, is more characteristic of the species than the tendency to allow one's thought processes to become dominated by tendencies that are more closely associated with one of the poles of human nature. Moreover, by virtue of his initial "switch settings," or by virtue of his average and most representative cognitive capacities and temperamental predispositions, man has a natural ability to reconcile opposites, or to synthesize disparate and apparently conflicting information about the world, including information about his political and social world.

8) MAN IS GENERALLY PREDISPOSED TOWARDS ACTIVITY AND ACQUISITIVE BEHAVIOR
As an expedient for survival, man has evolved a general tendency to be active and acquisitive. That is, he is more inclined by nature to seek out and acquire resources, especially those that are necessary for life and comfort. To some extent, humans are naturally predisposed to engage in accumulation behavior (also known as hoarding) as a hedge against future uncertainties, particularly conditions of scarcity.  Not being able to predict one's needs, and not being able to foresee future scarcity, one desires to accumulate as much as one can. When money is available as a medium of exchange, and as it represents the abstraction of survival value, it becomes the principal object of the acquisitive instinct.

Note: Acquisitive behavior has a potentially "antisocial" dimension to the extent that one person's acquisitive behavior can interfere with that of others. As such, man's acquisitive instincts represents a category of behavior that "naturally" gives rise to the need for social conventions designed to harness it or direct it in a way that is acceptable to the larger collective to which one belongs, or in a way that is designed to benefit the community. In addition, people will be more likely to engage in acquisitive behavior, and they will be more likely to do work that will benefit the community, under conditions where they know they cannot totally depend on someone else (such as government) for their sustenance, and under conditions where the government is not expropriating a very large portion of what they have labored to produce.

Taken to its extreme, the acquisitive drive or the desire to accumulate beyond one's immediate needs can translate into avarice, or an obsessive quest for money (and power). However, because the importance attached to money making varies so greatly between individuals, avarice would not seem to be the most representative tendency among human beings. Rather, it would seem that most people want to put forth enough effort to make the money they need to provide for themselves and their families, but typically, not much more beyond this. And, in those exceptional cases where people are motivated by avarice, the extent of social harm they cause may not be altogether clear. For, in some cases, avarice may be necessary to motivate some individuals to make valuable social contributions. What is clear is the need to channel and regulate such human dispositions, to the extent that they exist, in a way that will serve collective interests.

9) MAN HAS AN INNATE MORAL SENSE
Philosophers have been on the fence about this tendency for centuries. As it turns out, man really does have a moral sense, or a sense of right and wrong. More often than not this sense is born out of a fear of consequences that could follow from aggression or doing wrong to another. But, there are other dimensions to this sense as well. At a later stage in our moral development, the moral sense develops from a desire for social approval and simply from a desire to do things well in order to maintain or improve our self image.

Note: There is a tendency among many contemporary ethicists to see knowledge in juxtaposition to the process by which moral judgments are formed. That is to say, along with many humanists, and liberal-progressives, there is the tendency among ethicists to believe that you cannot derive an ought (a moral judgment) from an is (knowledge, or a set of facts). This is a false dichotomy that has been imposed by the tendency for ethicists to rely mainly on their sentiments and their feelings in reaching their moral determinations, whenever there might be a conflict between what their feelings suggest, versus what reason and knowledge would suggest. But, whenever there is a conflict between the proximal moral sense (the innate moral sense which is based on sentiments) versus the distal moral sense (that aspect of the moral sense which relies more on reason and knowledge), that conflict should generally be resolved in favor of the latter. The proximal moral sense is more appropriate as a guide to our everyday interactions with others. It is intended to be an everyday guide to moral behavior. By contrast, the distal moral sense is designed to function in those cases where more extensive knowledge is required to make the correct moral determinations. In such cases, we are morally obligated to acquire knowledge and to use it as the basis for moral determinations, rather than falling back on our sentiments or our feelings.

10) MAN HAS A CAPACITY FOR EMPATHY
Man has a natural capacity for empathy. This capacity is related to man's ability to see others as a reflection of himself. The degree to which man will be likely to see others as a reflection of himself will depend on the degree to which they possess traits that are visibly similar to his own. The degree to which others have traits that are visibly similar to one's own traits will depend on the degree to which they share one's essential genetic characteristics. That is to say, man is better able to see others as a reflection of himself in the degree that they share his essential genetic characteristics.

Humans evolved in highly racially homogeneous groups. In this natural state, where there tends to be a high degree of similarity between our own characteristics and the characteristics that we observe in others, we would be much more able to see others as reflections of ourselves. Consequently, we would be much more likely to feel empathy towards other members of our group. It is simply much easier and more natural for us to feel empathy towards those who come closer to sharing our essential genetic (racial) characteristics. That is to say, purely as a natural response and inclination, and in the absence of socialization that is designed to counter this innate tendency, we are more likely to feel empathy towards those who are more closely related to us genetically.

11) MAN HAS A CAPACITY FOR COMPETITION, RIVALRY AND POLARIZATION
Man has a natural capacity to compete with other individuals and groups over limited social, economic and political resources. The basic human capacity for competition manifests itself in a number of familiar forms. These include but are not limited to, economic competition between businesses and individuals, competitive political contests, and rivalries in athletic contests and in competitive sports. The capacity for competition can also manifest itself in the closely related complexes of rivalry and polarization.

12) MAN HAS A CAPACITY FOR AGGRESSION
Although man is more naturally inclined to avoid conflict and violence, he retains a capacity for violence and aggression in the defense of his vital interests, or when he perceives that he is being threatened. That is to say, as part of his evolutionary legacy, man retains a capacity for violence and aggression, as the situation demands. This capacity translates into a predisposition to resort to potentially violent means, especially when one perceives that one's vital interests are being threatened by groups that do not share one's essential normative or genetic characteristics.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW PICTURE OF HUMAN NATURE THAT IS EMERGING FROM THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES.
From the brief inventory of essential tendencies and capacities listed above we can begin to form a better picture of how man is more likely to behave naturally, and before any groups have attempted to impose their ideals upon him. This inventory also provides us with a picture of some of the most important capacities and tendencies which should inform our ideas about how human societies should be organized in order to be maximally stable, robust and conducive to human survivability over the longer term.

The picture of human nature that is unfolding in the behavioral sciences, from which the above inventory of essential human tendencies is derived, lies in stark contrast to the more idealistic view of human nature which continues to dominate the "social" sciences. The source of conflict between the view of human nature being revealed by the behavioral sciences, and that which continues to dominate the social sciences should be clear enough. Social scientists were never as concerned with what human nature might actually be like to begin with. How men are more inclined to behave naturally was irrelevant, as far as they were concerned. Rather, they were mainly concerned with championing a set of ideals about how they would "like" men to behave. They were more concerned with how to induce man to behave in ways that would be consistent with their ideals about how he should behave.

Social scientists were never concerned with the goal of attempting to bring human societies into closer accord with human nature as it actually exists. They only wanted to bring human society into closer accord with the ideals that they could extrapolate from their own unrepresentative sentiments and feelings. This is the aim of the contemporary social engineering project. But, with the picture of human nature that is now coming into view as a result of advances in the "behavioral" sciences, we now have the means to correct this project. We now have a more complete and accurate picture of human nature to work with. And, from this picture, we can begin to extrapolate principles of natural law, or those principles for organizing human societies in a way that will prove maximally conducive to human survivability.

The picture of human nature that is now coming into view is much too complex to give unconditional support to either the ideological left or the ideological right. This more complex picture of human nature tends to support a set of ideals that is much more ideologically synthetic and diverse, and which spans the full range of the ideological spectrum in its component parts. This view is in fact more "human" in the truest and most comprehensive sense of the word, because it reflects the full range of normally occurring temperaments and abilities, rather than those which have become more exclusively associated with either the left or the right. That is, it tends to support a more "synthetic" view of man, or a view of man as a complex synthesis of potentially opposing tendencies and capacities.

From the new understanding of human nature that has been coming into view as a result of advances in the behavioral sciences, we can extrapolate principles, values and ideals to serve as the basis for optimal, social, economic, political, legal and theological arrangements. We now have the means to construct societal forms that are in much closer accord with human nature than many current forms. We now have the means to place our societies on more stable and robust foundations. By extension, we now have the ability to organize human societies in a way that will prove to be maximally conducive to human survivability over the longer term.

ELEMENTS OF NATURAL LAW THAT CAN BE EXTRAPOLATED FROM THE ABOVE INVENTORY OF NATURAL TENDENCIES

1) SURVIVAL
From this strongest of human desires we can extrapolate the first or prime principle that  "maximizing the survivability of the species" is the highest value, or the value upon which all other values must be based, and to which they must be subordinate. In turn, from this principle, we can further extrapolate that, given the realities of economic life in modern, largely urban societies, given the condition in which large numbers of people have been separated from the means of production and from the means of securing their own subsistence; given that, even under conditions of so called full employment, the natural employment level in such societies will tend to consistently fall short of the number of people who want to work and who are capable of performing work, that, as a matter of necessity, the state must assume some responsibility for providing a means of subsistence for those who need it. But, in return for the grant of such aid, the state should receive the assurance that the recipients of such aid will meet certain requirements, that they will abide by certain guidelines, and that they will meet certain standards of appropriate behavior, to insure that they do not become an additional burden to the state in the future, and to insure that their dependence on the state will be minimized.

2)SEX
Over the course of human evolution, heterosexuality has proven to be the more natural, functional and representative tendency of the species. Quite obviously, it is the tendency that would have proven to be more conducive to procreation, and therefore, the tendency that would have proven to be more conducive to the maximization of human survivability. Because heterosexuality is by far the stronger, the more representative and functional tendency among human beings, it is the tendency that should serve as the main reference point for sexual behaviors that are to be sanctioned by the state.

From the general tendency for humans to be heterosexual, or as the more natural, representative and functional sexual tendency among human beings, we can extrapolate certain principles. First, because heterosexuality is the more natural, representative and functional tendency of the species, it confers certain rights on those who conform more closely with this tendency (i.e. heterosexuals). Conversely, we can extrapolate the principle that homosexuals should not have any special rights or privileges, simply by virtue of the fact that they are homosexuals, or simply by virtue of the fact that they engage in a form of sexual behavior that is less representative of the species, less functional, and less conducive to survivability. On this basis alone, we are not obligated to make any special attempts to accommodate homosexuals, or to pass special laws that are designed to accord them co-equal status with heterosexuals. The heterosexual institution of marriage is a case in point. The state should continue to sanction marriage exclusively in terms of a monogamous relationship between a man an a woman.

Note: Because the current incidence of homosexuality in certain developed nations is such an aberration from our evolutionary experience (it would not have been conducive to our survival over the course of our evolution for it to have been as common as it is today) strongly suggests that cultural determinants are now playing a larger role in its occurrence than has been the case historically. Alternatively, because our medical technology is allowing people to survive who would not have otherwise be fit for survival in a state of nature, it can be argued that homosexuality which has genetic roots has also been increasing over time, and that it could possibly serve eugenic functions by its tendency to "dead end" those who have the trait. But, in the majority of cases, it is more likely to be the result of cultural than biological factors. Specifically, it is more likely to be a result of the fact that normative influences, such as those which emanate from popular culture, and values associated with the Zeitgeist (such as tolerance) have merely entered a dysfunctional range.

With the way it depicts homosexuality as a basically innocuous form of sexual behavior, the popular culture has become the main driving force behind attempts to remove the "natural" stigma that is associated with homosexuality. In the process of trying to promote "tolerance" towards homosexuals, the popular culture has unavoidably reduced normative inhibitions to engage in homosexual behavior. Thus, the popular culture has unavoidably contributed to the increasing incidence of homosexuality.

Contemporary social engineers in the West mainly want to depict homosexuality in a more acceptable light in order to encourage other members of society to be more tolerant towards homosexuals. The mental health community has followed a similar course, by no longer classifying homosexuality as a form of sexual deviance. (One can only wonder how long it might be before mental health professionals attempt to reclassify pedophilia as a normatively acceptable behavior.) Yet, in the final analysis, and from the standpoint of what is most functional, and what is most in accord with human interests more generally, homosexuality must still be regarded as an aberrant form of sexual behavior.

3)LANGUAGE ABILITY AND THE ABILITY TO REASON
From the natural capacity to form and use language we can extrapolate certain principles. First, we can extrapolate the principle that mannaturally has certain basic rights such as freedom of speech and assembly. Secondly, due to the average propensity to use language, and the average ability to think in terms of higher order abstractions, we can extrapolate the principle that humans are naturally predisposed to have a higher level of cognition than prevailing cultural, social, political or religious forms suggest. From the average facility with language, or from the average ability to think in terms of higher order abstractions, we can also extrapolate the principle that people have a moral obligation to use their ability to reason in terms of language to acquire useful knowledge about the world, or knowledge that they can use to maximize their own survivability, and human survivability more generally. We can extrapolate the further principle that because people have the ability to reason at a relatively high level of abstraction that they have a corresponding moral obligation to insure that this level of abstraction is reflected in the sophistication of the essential values and belief systems they hold.

4)MAN IS A HIERARCHICAL CREATURE
From the natural tendency to rank others, or to assign them a place in a social hierarchy, we can extrapolate certain principles that have implications for the ideal of social equality. Specifically, we can extrapolate the principle that to the extent that others we come into contact with in society have fundamentally different characteristics, the assignment of differential social evaluations to others will tend to be a natural result. That is, the assignment of unequal evaluations to other members of society is natural to the extent that they do not possess traits or characteristics that one values or regards as equal to one's own traits or characteristics.

From the basic tendency to evaluate others depending on whether or not they possess like characteristics, or characteristics that we value, or from the tendency to rank people or assign them a place in a social hierarchy, we can extrapolate the principle that social hierarchies are a more natural feature of societies with more heterogeneous populations. That is to say, a condition of social inequality is more natural, to the extent that a society is not homogeneous, or not comprised of people who would tend to evaluate one another as equals. Conversely, we can extrapolate the further principle that a condition of social equality is a more natural condition in a society in which people are more likely to evaluate one another as equals, because of certain basic similarities which they share. And, we can also extrapolate the principle that whether or not we evaluate others as our social equals will depend mainly on whether or not they possess certain traits that we value and share.

The natural tendency to evaluate others or to assign them a social rank might lead one to the conclusion that "social inequality" is destined to be a permanent feature of all human societies. As it turns out, the ideal of social equality is no less consistent with this particular feature of human nature (the basic tendency to socially evaluate others) than is a state of social inequality. Rather, the probability that a society will have either a high or a low level of social inequality depends on the degree to which its members are likely to evaluate one another as social equals. In turn, the degree to which they are likely to evaluate one another as social equals will depend on the degree to which they share essential characteristics that all other members in society value.

5)MAN HAS XENOPHOBIC TENDENCIES
From the capacity to experience a xenophobic response to the perception of significant differences (differences which correspond to race) in others, we can extrapolate the principles that societies with highly racially homogeneous populations are more natural, functional and stable arrangements than more racially heterogeneous societies. A society that violates this fundamental principle of social organization will tend to be less stable and robust than a society that is constructed in accordance with this principle. The most racially heterogeneous societies should be regarded as historical accidents. And, it should be a major objective of social engineering attempts to restore them to a more natural basis.

6) MAN HAS A NATURAL CAPACITY FOR REFLECTION AND A PREDISPOSITION TO ENGAGE IN TRANSCENDENTAL THOUGHT
From man’s basic and universal capacity for transcendental thinking, certain principles can be extrapolated. Specifically, from the predisposition to engage in transcendental thinking, and within certain bounds that have been defined by reason and knowledge, man has the freedom or right to religious beliefs (and to associate with others on the basis of these shared beliefs). But, the grant of religious freedoms is not an absolute, and those beliefs that are permissible must be determined by what is functional.

Because it is the nature and tendency of religious thought to spring forth from the imagination, and because such thinking can commonly assume forms that are based on myth and superstitions, we can extrapolate the principle that the state must have some reasonable authority to constrain and determine those religious forms and practices that will be allowed. That is to say, it must have some authority to contain the expression of religious freedoms within certain bounds, to insure that this expression takes a form that reason and knowledge suggest would be most conducive to the public welfare.

Note: Constitutions should include language designed to achieve greater uniformity and homogeneity of religious beliefs. And while the state should not go so far as to establish any single religion, the state clearly has an interest in creating an environment in which the most functional religious doctrines will be likely to flourish, and an environment that will discourage less functional religious doctrines from taking root. The Constitution should clearly favor those religious doctrines which experience suggests are the most functional. Accordingly, Christianity, Buddhism and the TXS should be given first preference.

7) MAN IS MORE NATURALLY PREDISPOSED TO TO THINK "SYNTHETICALLY" THAN IN POLARIZED TERMS
From the ability to synthesize, we can extrapolate the principle that man is more naturally predisposed to form or adopt synthetic belief systems as the basis for his forms of social, economic and political organization. As a result, people are no more innately predisposed to become liberals than they are to become conservatives. And, they only tend to become liberals or conservatives in response to the cultural milieu that they have been exposed to, typically, from an early age. This also means that at the aggregate level, most people will have the natural capacity to perform ideological synthesis and to adopt a more synthetic system of values, attitudes and beliefs.

The relatively high level of ideological polarization that has come to be one of the defining characteristics of political systems in the West is  much less evident in Asian cultures. Yet, one might ask, why wouldn't it be just as likely for what is more normal for Asian societies to be a cultural artifact, rather than serving as evidence of a more representative tendency among human beings? The answer is that the tendency to synthesize, or to think in more "gray" combinatorial terms, rather than in more black and white terms, has been the more common and representative tendency throughout human history and across cultures. And, this tendency was also evident in our own political culture (that of the U.S.) at the time of the founding. Cases where political cultures are more deeply divided along ideological lines (such as liberalism and conservatism) are less representative of human experience more generally. Contemporary cases often represent attempts by political regimes to emulate our own bifurcated political culture. The tendency towards synthesis remains the more representative and "fully human" tendency.

Synthesis or "combinatorial thinking" is more natural than the tendency to form dichotomous belief systems, or those which are organized along principles that are polar opposites. By extension, the ability to reconcile opposites and to integrate apparently conflicting information to form a more comprehensive and coherent belief systems is a natural cognitive capacity. From this basic capacity we can extrapolate the principle that because a synthetic belief system is more natural and functional than polar belief systems, it should serve as the basis for a political system.

8) MAN IS GENERALLY PREDISPOSED TOWARDS ACTIVITY AND ACQUISITIVE BEHAVIOR
From the natural tendencies to be active and acquisitive we can logically extrapolate certain principles. Specifically, we can extrapolate basic rights of private property, as well as the freedom to engage in economic activity. By direct extension, we can extrapolate the obligation to be as economically self sufficient as possible. And, we can extrapolate the further principle that, given the structural limitations of a modern industrial economy, that some government intervention in the economy may be necessary from time to time simply to insure that all who are capable of work, and willing to work, will have an opportunity to work.

9) MAN HAS AN INNATE MORAL SENSE
From man’s ability to reason, and from the innate moral sense that he has been endowed with by the process of evolution to help him make moral judgments, we can extrapolate certain principles. First, the ability to reason and to make moral judgments imposes certain obligations on man. Specifically, from the ability to reason, and in conjunction with the innate moral sense, comes the obligation to be judgmental, or the obligation to make moral judgments. We can extrapolate the further principle that with the ability to reason and to learn, and with the capacity to make moral judgments comes the moral obligation to acquire the knowledge that is necessary to make moral judgments correctly.

Moral principles are functional principles, or principles that are related to the maximization of human survivability. From the ability to reason and to make moral judgments we can extrapolate the principle that man has an obligation to acquire knowledge that would allow him to make correct moral determinations, or knowledge that would allow him to exercise his moral sense in a way that would generally prove most conducive to the survivability of the species. And, we can extrapolate the further principle that any failure to do this is ultimately a moral-functional failure that can have extremely adverse consequences at either the personal, societal or species levels. In other words, it is a failure for which we can all ultimately be held accountable. Adverse consequences tend to naturally follow from moral-functional failures.

10) MAN HAS A CAPACITY FOR EMPATHY
From the tendency to empathize with those with whom we share a higher degree of genetic similarity, we can extrapolate certain principles. First, in order to foster a sense of noblese oblige in a society, (which is necessary in some degree in order to provide material support for those who are thrown out of work during economic downturns), human societies should be organized along highly racially homogeneous lines. Secondly, societies should be organized in such a way that they can more easily rely on the natural bonds of affinity that exist between groups that share a higher degree of genetic (racial) similarity, and in order to avoid conflicts that would be more likely to occur between groups that are more genetically dissimilar. As with the xenophobic response, the tendency to empathize most with those who come closest to sharing our essential genetic traits emerges as one of the strongest justifications for organizing our societies along highly racially homogeneous lines.

11) MAN HAS A CAPACITY FOR COMPETITION, RIVALRY AND POLARIZATION
From the general capacity for competitive behavior, we can extrapolate basic principles of economic competition and a free economy. From the human capacity for competition, rivalry and polarization we can extrapolate the principle that a competitive economic system, or one which operates on the basis of free market principles, will be generally more productive and more likely to produce a higher standard of living for its people than alternative forms. We can extrapolate the further principle that government should foster the development of such systems, by not burdening the private sector with an excessive and unnecessary level of either taxation or regulation.

12) MAN HAS A CAPACITY FOR AGGRESSION
From the basic capacity for aggression, a number of principles can be extrapolated. First, we can extrapolate the principle that man's capacity for aggression confers upon everyone else the right to use aggression (potentially violent means) in their own self defense. And, from this, we can further extrapolate the right to bear arms for the purpose of self defense. Additionally, we can extrapolate the moral obligation to volunteer for military service, at least when one’s nation is in imminent danger, or in time of war.

Only by relying on the full repertoire of traits that man has been endowed with by the process of evolution will man be best equipped to deal with the full range of challenges to his survival that he is likely to encounter at some point, at the aggregate or the species level. That is to say, when attempting to identify a primary set of values to use as the main reference point for designing human societies, it will generally be a better strategy to extrapolate our values from the full range of capacities and tendencies that we have been endowed with by the process of evolution, rather than just one part of it. And, when values that are more exclusively associated with only one pole are used as a basis for a form of social organization (a society), that form of social organization will tend to be unstable, and less well adapted to face the full range of challenges that are more likely to be encountered at the societal or the species level over the longer term.
 

COPYRIGHT 2012 BY ALEX VAN ALLEN